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BANKING ON A BAILOUT: DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUSIONS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS
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A record number of savings and loan associations (S&Ls)1 have
failed in the past few years, resulting in a financial crisis that has
placed a phenomenal burden on the federal budget. The S&L
debacle has spawned a great variety of litigation between federal
regulators and the directors and officers (D&Os) of failed S&Ls, the
latter widely regarded as major culprits in the crisis because of press
reports detailing reckless, and sometimes outright fraudulent,
management practices. Like the D&Os of other corporations, S&L
managers frequently carry D&O liability insurance.2 The federal
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1 Savings and Loan Associations are depository institutions whose two main
functions have been to hold checking and saving deposit accounts and to provide
loans, primarily residential mortgages. S&Ls may be chartered under either federal
or state law, and they may be formally organized in either stock or mutual form. See
LAwRENCEJ. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE 13-15 (1991). For a detailed description of
the industry, see id. at 14-23; see also WALTERJ. WOERHEIDE, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN
INDUSTRY 3-27 (1984) (discussing the history of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System). S&Ls are distinguished from commercial banks by the dominance of
residential mortgage lending in their portfolios. See Alex M. Azar II, Note, FIRREA:
ControllingSavings and Loan Association Credit Risk Through Capital Standards and Asset
Restrictions, 100 YALE L.J. 149, 151 (1990). The term "thrift institution" applies to
S&Ls as well as other financial institutions such as credit unions, which take deposits
from, and provide consumer loans to, members of a defined group such as labor
unions or college students. See id. at 150 & n.3.
2 D&O liability insurance protects corporate D&Os against the liabilities that they
may incur for decisions they make in their corporate capacity. These liabilities may
arise out of decisions regarding such things as investments, takeovers and mergers,
and securities regulation matters. Under state laws, the corporation itself is
permitted, and in certain instances required, to indemnify the D&Os for some of
these liabilities. SeeJohn A. Cottingham, Note, The D&O Insurance Crisis: Darkness
at the End of the Tunnel, 39 S.C. L. REV. 653, 676-84 (1988). Accordingly, a typical
D&O policy comes in two parts. The first part covers the D&Os directly, and the
(547)
548 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:547
government naturally attempts to recover on these policies when it
sues insured S&L executives. Federal regulators' attempts at
recovery from insurance companies have been hindered, however,
by exclusions found in many D&O policies that were introduced by
insurers in the mid-1980s in anticipation of the massive D&O
liabilities that would result from widespread failures of S&Ls.
Arguably, these exclusions deny coverage for suits brought by
federal banking regulatory agencies. A court's interpretation of the
scope and permissibility of these exclusions often decides the fate
of the government's multi-million dollar suits against D&O insurers.
The exclusion litigation has been particularly contentious because
the federal regulators often argue that any exclusion meant to bar
their suits should be invalidated on its face on grounds of public
policy. They argue that these exclusions interfere with their
statutory duty, under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),3 to resolve the failed S&Ls. This
Comment will comprehensively review both the substance of this
litigation and the policy issues lurking beneath it.
Specifically, Part I of this Comment will address the dimensions
of the S&L crisis and the D&O liability litigation that followed. The
two policy exclusions that have slowed federal regulators' recovery
efforts will also be illustrated. Part II proceeds with a detailed
analysis of the main legal issues involved in this litigation. The
arguments typically made by regulators and insurance companies
with respect to each exclusion, as well as the court decisions
evaluating these arguments, will be explored. Part II will explain
the decisions of the courts with respect to these exclusions and
conclude that they are generally consistent with established
insurance law principles.
In addition to extensive litigation, federal regulators have
recently called upon Congress to pass legislation making exclusions
directed at regulators illegitimate as a matter of public policy.
4
Part III of this Comment will argue the opposite: an analysis based
second part covers the corporation for the amounts it is obligated to provide as
indemnification for its D&Os. See DAN L. GOLDWASSER, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
LIABxrY INSURANCE AND SELF INSURANCE 32 (1986).
3 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). This is a comprehensive law passed to structure the response
of the federal government to the S&L failures and to introduce a number of
regulatory reforms. Some of these reforms are discussed in detail below. See infra
notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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on basic insurance-economics principles leads to the conclusion that
exclusions barring suits by federal regulators are not only legitimate
in the context of the S&L debacle, but a necessary prerequisite for
S&L managers to obtain private insurance in the first place. In a
sentence, the Comment argues that the FDIC is essentially asking
insurance companies to insure what should never be insured
privately, and that any economically rational insurance company in
the early 1980s would have been very wrong not to exclude
regulatory suits.
I. THE S&L CRISIS AND D&O LIABILITY INSURANCE LITIGATION
The extraordinarily high rate of S&L failures over the past few
years5 will impose enormous costs on the federal government and
the U.S. taxpayer. The total cost of the S&L crisis is as yet uncer-
tain, but is invariably measured in the hundreds of billions of
dollars.6 The federal government, as insurer of the depositors'
accounts, is ultimately responsible for reimbursing the majority of
these losses. This section will describe both the government's role
as insurer of S&L deposit accounts and its attempts to relieve this
burden by suing other potentially responsible parties.
Since the 1930s, the federal government has insured deposits in
banks, S&Ls, and other depository institutions, up to a limit per
account that has increased over time, reaching $100,000 in 1980.Y
5 See S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) (stating that more than 500
Savings and Loan Associations became insolvent between 1980 and 1988). "That
number will be closer to 800 when the [government] takes over its last failed thrift
in 1992." Albert V. Casey, A Bigger Bucket for Bailout Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1991, at A31.6 See Stephen Labaton, New Finance Woes: F.D.LC. Loss Worse; S. & L Crisis
Deeper, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1991, at Al (reporting that the S&L rescue is "in such
disarray" that the General Accounting Office could not update its 1990 estimate);
Michael Quint, New Estimate on Savings Bailout Says Cost Could Be $500 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7,1990, atAl (reporting the 1990 General Accounting Office's estimate).
These estimates seem to increase with time. See G. Christian Hill, A Never Ending
Stoy: An Introduction to the S&L Symposium, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 21, 23 (1990)
(showingaJuly 1989 estimate of about $200 billion and a May 1990 estimate of about
$450 billion for bailout costs through 1999). Long term costs must take into account
the interest the federal government pays on loans incurred toward its obligation. The
total costs thus may well exceed a trillion dollars. See id. at 24.
7 See WHITE, supra note 1, at 55. The percentage of all deposits that is insured by
the federal government also has increased over time. See Catherine England, Federal
Deposit Insurance Reform: The Road Not Taken, 45 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 249, 251
(1991) (reporting that between 1985 and 1987 federally insured funds had increased
to 75% of all S&L deposits).
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Until 1989, deposits in S&Ls were insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), and the S&Ls themselves
were under the chartering, regulatory, and supervisory authority of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB).8 In August of 1989,
FIRREA, 9 the major piece of legislation aimed at resolving the
failed S&Ls and recapitalizing the S&L deposit insurance fund,
became law. FIRREA abolished the FHLBB and the then-insolvent
FSLIC, transferred FHLBB's regulatory powers to the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS),1 0 established the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC),1 1 whose function is to manage and resolve the
failed S&Ls, and transferred FSLIC's insurance functions to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),12 a government
body already responsible for insuring deposits in commercial
banks.
1 3
Under this regulatory scheme, when an insured S&L fails, the
government typically becomes its receiver and pays off the insured
depositors either directly or indirectly by arranging a transfer of the
failed institution's assets to a solvent institution14 and supplying
Deposit insurance is a straightforward insurance contract in which a premium is
assessed proportionally to the amount of money held in an account and paid to the
federal government. In return, the government promises to pay the depositor her
insured money if it is lost when a bank or S&L becomes insolvent. Since the
government is obligated, as an insurer, to reimburse any losses up to the $100,000
per account limit, it is inaccurate to refer to these payments as a "bailout." In
essence, the government is simply honoring insurance contracts into which it had
voluntarily entered. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 163 (asserting that payments by the
federal deposit insurance funds were "the direct or indirect honoring of insurance
obligations and were not subsidies").
° See Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,45 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1013-14,
1017-18 (1990) (describing generally the regulation of the S&L industry prior to
FIRREA).
9 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C).
10 See 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. II 1990).
" See id. § 1441a(b)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
12 See id. § 1821a (Supp. II 1990).
13 See id. § 1811 (1988). This simply serves as an introduction to the major
agencies involved in regulating banks and S&Ls before and after FIRREA was passed.
For comprehensive and detailed analyses of FIRREA, see Clark et al., supra note 8;
Daniel B. Gail &JosephJ. Norton, A Decade'sJourneyfrom 'Deregulation"to "Supervisoy
Reregulation': The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
45 Bus. LAw. 1103 (1990).
14 This is typically done through a so-called Purchase and Assumption Transaction.
See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REPORT ON DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
INSURANCE AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS BONDS PURSUANT TO SECTION 220(B)(3)
OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REFORM, RECOVERY, AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF
REGULATORY EXCLUSION
the difference between the lost insured deposits and the total value
of the assets transferred.' 5 The government's outlays in each
resolution are typically high, especially since failed institutions have
been allowed to operate a number of years after they have become
insolvent, thus incurring more and more debt.16 The resolution
costs of a single institution can exceed one billion dollars.
17
Faced with obligations of such enormous magnitude, govern-
ment regulators18 have attempted to relieve the burden by suing
the D&Os of failed S&Ls. If the institution's insolvency can
arguably be attributed to the negligence or other wrongdoing of
such D&Os, the FDIC, as the S&L's receiver, can sue on behalf of
the institution and its depositors. 19 Evidence strongly suggests
that the D&Os of many failed S&Ls frequently made negligent or
reckless management and investment decisions.20 The FDIC has
1989, at 25 (1991) [hereinafter FDIC REPORT]. For a description of this type of
transaction, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk
Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1182-84 (1988).
15 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 25.
16 The average duration of insolvency for institutions resolved in 1988 was three
and one-half years. SeeJames R. Barth & R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., The Rough Road
from FIRREA to Deposit Insurance Reform, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 58, 64 (1990).
17 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 25.
1 8" Government regulatory agencies" refers to the FSLIC before FIRREA, and the
FDIC since. Hereinafter, "the FDIC" will be used when referring to both.
19 For a general overview of some of the issues arising in litigation between
regulators and S&L directors and officers, see WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 12.08-.09 (4th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1990); Judy Y. Barrasso, Litigating Claims Against Directors and Officers of Failing
Financial Institutions, in FAILING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 59,59 (American Law Inst.-
Am. Bar Ass'n Committee on Continuing Professional Educ. ed., 1991); Danny Clear-
man, Comment, FDIC and FSLIC Pursuit of Claims Against Officers, Directors, and Others
Involved with Failed Lenders, 58 MIss. L.J. 89, 102-20 (1988); Thomas P. Fitch, The Heat
is On, U.S. BANKER, June 1985, at 32.
The prevalence of claims against D&Os should not imply that deposits were
embezzled by S&L managers. Lack of care in the performance of their duties is
sufficient grounds for D&O liability. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 198.
20 See JAMES R. ADAMS, THE BIG FIX: INSIDE THE S&L SCANDAL passim (1990);
MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY passim (1990); Joseph A.
Grundfest, Lobbying into Limbo: The Political Ecology of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 2
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 25 (1990). The FDIC reported recently that, "[i]n the only
systematic study" of bank management, the government found that more than 90%
of the banks closed by the government between 1979 and 1987 suffered from
"significant mismanagement," 35% from 'insider abuse," and 11% from fraud. FDIC
REPORT, supra note 14, at 26.
With that knowledge, Congress expanded governmental enforcement authority
by passing FIRREA. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 19, § 12.02 (Supp. 1990);
Clark et al., supra note 8, at 1028-31 (describing the expanded enforcement powers
of the OTS and the FDIC).
1992]
552 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:547
forcefully pursued many of these D&Os with lawsuits alleging
breach of the duty of care and seeking tens of millions of dollars,
often with great success.2 1 The FDIC has also sought, with equal
vigor, to recover from failed institutions' attorneys and accountants
in malpractice suits.
22
Still, the FDIC does not sue every time it suspects wrongdoing
by an officer, director, or outside professional; rather, it pursues its
possible claims only when it appears cost effective to do so. "[E]ven
when there may be a good case on the merits, the FDIC will
normally not bring a civil suit against officers and directors when
21 See FDIC Considers Suits Against 5'I., Bank Officials in 1,300 Institutions, 55
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 97,97 (July 16,1990) (noting that "[i]n the first quarter
of 1990 alone, the FDIC and RTC recovered more than $100 million"); FDIC Official
Defends Legal Division, Says Unit CooperatingwithJustice Dept., 57 Banking Rep. (BNA)
No. 22, at 903, 903 (Dec. 2, 1991) [hereinafter Legal Division] ("The professional
liability section, which is responsible for action against institution directors, officers,
and other professionals, has recovered $877 million since 1988... ."); FSLIC Wins
$86 MillionJudgement in Defunct Louisiana Thrift Case, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 24,
at 1291, 1291 (June 12,1989); Mark A. Hofmann, Bank s D&'O Insurers Reach Tentative
Pact, Bus. INS., Nov. 7, 1988, at 11 (discussing a proposed $60 million settlement in
the FDIC suit against Continental Illinois Corporation); Marianne Lavelle, FDIC:
Tough Choices on Firms, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 1990, at 3 ("With 800 law firms handling
100,000 suits at a price tag of $500 million this year, FDIC is in charge of a bigger
litigation program than any U.S. regulatory agency ever has been called upon to
manage."); RTC Seeks $140 Million in D&'O Lawsui Names Ariz. Gov. Symington as
Defendant, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1053 (Dec. 23, 1991).
2 See, e.g., Linda Himelstein,Jones, Day Adopts Aggressive No.Settle Policy, N.J. L.J.,
Apr. 18, 1991, at 5 (stating that the RTC sought $50 million from the law firm of
Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue in a malpractice suit); Rita H.Jensen, RTC Sues Jones
Day, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 2 (reporting a regulator suit against Jones, Day,
Reavis, and Pogue as well as other attorneys); Stephen Labaton, U.S. Moves to Freeze
Assets of Law Firm for S&L Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al (describing action
against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler); Walter Lucas, Malpractice Rate Hikes
on the Horizon, Again: The S & L Crisis and Economic Downturn Are Cited as Tiggers,
N.J. LJ.,Jan. 31, 1991, at 3 (stating that "federal regulators in the past three years
have recovered [some] $95 million from attorneys who represented banks and
[S&Ls]"); Deborah Shalowitz, Insurers to Pay $50 Million to FSLIC in E&O Settlement,
Bus. INS., Aug. 15, 1988, at 2 (reporting a $50 million recovery against a law firm);
Sherry R. Sontag, Soured Deals Snag More Professionals, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 1
(reporting an increase in regulator suits against professionals in order to replenish
the deposit insurance funds).
Congress specifically complained of the perceived poor performance of outside
accountants in assessing S&Ls' financial position and dealings. See, e.g., Failure of
Independent CPA's to Identify Fraud, Waste, and Mismanagement and Assure Accurate
Financial Position of Troubled S&Ls: Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1989) [hereinafter Accountant
Hearing] (citing survey of failed S&Ls that revealed 6 of 11 were not audited in
accordance with professional standards).
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the anticipated recovery is not expected to exceed the attorneys'
fees and other costs of pursuing the case."
23
The FDIC typically hires private law firms to litigate its claims,
and these firms' fees have tended to be exorbitant,24 increasing
the FDIC's costs. Furthermore, the targets of the FDIC's suits may
have modest holdings, especially when compared to the magnitude
of the claims the FDIC advances. 25 This is particularly true for
directors of S&Ls, whose incomes as directors are typically low to
moderate. 26 In deciding whether a case would be cost effective,
the FDIC considers the defendants' total assets, including the
D&Os' liability insurance policies.27 These policies are frequently
D&Os' most important assets, and, as one commentator asserted,
"may even encourage litigation that might not have been brought
but for the insurance."
28
As the FDIC became more aggressive in pursuing D&Os of
failed S&Ls in the mid-to-late 1980s, the D&O insurers attempted to
prevent reimbursement of the FDIC for losses incurred by D&Os of
failed institutions, turning to two exclusions in their policies, the
regulatory exclusion and the insured v. insured exclusion.29 The
language of the typical regulatory exclusion makes clear its purpose
23 FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 27.
24 SeeJeff Gerth, U.S. Said to Squander Millions for Legal Work on the Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at I (estimating that the FDIC would spend $700 million on
private legal help in 1991).
25 See supra notes 21-22.
26 See Fitch, supra note 19, at 32 ("[T]he risks associated with being a director have
suddenly become massive, and the costs associated with those risks can be mind-
boggling. Even as remuneration remains low.").
gg The FDIC has outlined their process of case selection as follows:
In determining whether a meritorious claim would be cost effective the
FDIC looks at: (1) the appropriate defendants' assets and liabilities (and
what they could keep in bankruptcy, taking into account, for example, the
almost unlimited "homestead" exemption in Texas and certain other states)
and (2) applicable directors' and officers' liability insurance (or in the case
of fraud or theft, any applicable bond policy). Also, defendants do not
always have the financial resources they are believed to have when cases are
filed. D&O suits are not brought, however, unless it is expected that cases
of that type will, on average, yield significantly more than they cost.
FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 27.
28 Robert S. Lavet, Insurance Companies: The Last Deep Pocket in the S&9L Crisis, 58
DEF. COUNS.J. 211, 211 (1991).
29 See Russell Leibson & Paula LaBrie, Running for Cover: Insurers Are Struggling
to Escape Liability for the Acts of Executives of Failed S&9Ls Through Exclusion Provisions
in WDfO'Policies, THE REcORDER, Aug. 12, 1991, at 4 (addressing a developing trend
of exclusion clauses in insurance policies and the willingness of the courts to enforce
them).
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is specifically to deny coverage to federal deposit insurers and
related regulatory agencies:
[this policy does not cover] any action or proceeding brought by
or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, any other
depository insurance organization, the Comptroller of the
Currency, The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or any other
national or state regulatory agency (all of said organizations and
agencies hereinafter referred to as "Agencies"), including any type
of legal action which such Agencies have the legal right to bring
as receiver, conservator, liquidator or otherwise; whether such
action or proceeding is brought in the name of such Agencies or
by or on behalf of such Agencies in the name of any other entity
or solely in the name of any Third Party.
3 0
The insured v. insured exclusion denies coverage when one insured
under the D&O policy is the defendant in a liability suit brought by
another person or entity insured under the same policy. An insured
v. insured exclusion might provide that "it is agreed that the
Company shall not be liable to make any payment for loss in
connection with any claim or claims made against the Insured(s) by
any other Insured(s) as defined in the Policy, except for sharehold-
er's derivative actions."31 The exclusion typically applies when a
corporation sues one or more of its own D&Os in an effort to
trigger coverage.3 2 Insurers attempt to apply the exclusion to the
FDIC by arguing that the agency becomes an "insured" when it acts
as receiver for the failed S&L.
While a variety of coverage issues are involved in D&O insur-
ance litigation in general, the validity and effect of these two
30 Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
(quoting the insurance policy endorsement at issue).
3i St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 765 F. Supp. 538, 548 (D. Minn. 1991)
(quoting the insurance policy at issue), aff'd, 968 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1992). Some
policies do not have an exception for shareholder derivative suits. For example, see
the policy at issue in Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. FSLIC, 695 F. Supp. 469, 481 (C.D. Cal.
1987).
32 Both the corporation and the corporation's executives are insured by typical
D&O policies. See supra note 2. Absent any exclusion, a corporation's suit against
its own executives may be covered. See, e.g, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst
Corp., 662 F. Supp. 36, 39 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (holding that an insurance policy that
had no insured v. insured exclusion covered damages awarded in a suit by
shareholders against the corporation's directors), aff'dsub nom. Davis Wright &Jones
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, the insured
v. insured exclusion avoids collusion between the corporation and the executives and
prevents a corporation from triggering coverage merely by filing suit.
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exclusions are repeatedly and almost exclusively33 the central
issues in high-stakes D&O coverage litigation.3 4  Because of its
concern about keeping all possible sources available to replenish the
deposit insurance fund, the FDIC has contested these exclusions in
court attempting either to prevent their applicability to itself or to
invalidate them altogether.3 5 The stakes in D&O cases may well
run into the tens of millions of dollars.3 6 The FDIC, therefore,
continues to combat the effectiveness of these exclusions.3 7 Most
recently, the FDIC released a report specifically addressing these
exclusions and recommending that Congress legislatively prohibit
the enforcement of these clauses against the FDIC.38 For their
part, the insurers continue to defend these exclusions, motivated by
the fear of incurring substantial liabilities if they do not.
3 9
Litigation over the enforceability of exclusion clauses seems
likely to extend beyond D&O liability insurance policies. Attorney
33 All regulatory exclusion cases have involved the FDIC, FSLIC, and similar
deposit insurance regulatory agencies.
4 See Lavet, supra note 28 passim (detailing the prominence of these two
exclusions in S&L coverage litigation); Leibson & LaBrie, supra note 29passim (same).
35 See Lavet, supra note 28 passim.
36 See supra notes 21-22.
17 In response to public and congressional pressure, the FDIC is currently
aggressively pursuing legal means to relieve the burden on the deposit insurance
fund. See AlanJ. Whitney, Getting After the Savings and Loan Crooks, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1990, at A18 (director of the FDIC's Office of Corporate Communications
describing the FDIC's commitment to pursue S&L executives, lawyers, other
professionals, and "those who insure their conduct"). In a House hearing on
FIRREA, Congressman LaFalce stated:
There is one thing I would definitely like to see us do. Everybody talks
about going after the crooks in the S&L industry, and we should.... But
I would also like to see us go after the inept, the negligent officers and
directors of these institutions for whatever civil liability they may be
responsible for.
Almost all of them, I would assume; would have directors and officers
liability insurance. Therefore, they would be covered in extremely high
amounts for whatever cause of actions we could be successful in bringing.
See Accountant Hearing, supra note 22, at 6.
38 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 19-22. The report was released in
September 1991. See id.; see also D&O Study Says Legislative Action Needed to Address
Court Decisions Against FDIC, 57 BankingRep. (BNA) No. 13, at 511,512-13 (Sept. 30,
1991) (recounting the suggestion that the timing of the report's release was planned
to influence bank legislation then pending in Congress).
39 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, app. A at 5-11 (summarizing D&O insurers'
comments submitted to FDIC defending the exclusion); Lavet, supra note 28, at 211
(referring to the suggestion that the refusal by some courts to enforce the exclusions
"is simply a politically expedient way to pass part of the costs of the thrift and bank
bailouts on to the insurance companies").
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malpractice insurers have started scrutinizing more carefully the
policies they underwrite or renew for attorneys who worked in the
S&L industry.40  Motivated by the massive potential liabilities41
and the aggressiveness of the FDIC in pressing its claims against
D&O liability carriers,4 2 attorney malpractice insurers have already
obtained the permission of insurance commissioners in several
states to sell legal malpractice policies containing regulatory
exclusions similar to those in D&O policies.43 Since the FDIC
seems determined to challenge their applicability," the litigation
over regulatory exclusion clauses in the S&L context has perhaps
onlyjust begun. The balance of this Comment will analyze the legal
and policy issues that will be the focal point of this high-stakes
insurance coverage litigation.
45
II. THE D&O POLICY EXCLUSIONS IN THE COURTS
Both before and after FIRREA was passed, an insolvent S&L (or
bank) typically fell under the receivership or conservatorship of
federal regulatory agencies. FIRREA granted the FDIC the
40 See Barbara Franklin, Cutting Their Losses: Insurers Seek to Limit Exposure Due to
Lawpyers, N.Y. L.J.,June 27,1991, at 5 (describinghow insurers scrutinize lawyers who
take positions on S&Ls' boards of directors); Linda Himelstein, Insurers Cutting Ties
to Counsel in the S&L Fiasco, THE RECORDER, May 1, 1991, at 1 (describing how
insurers are increasingly including exclusion clauses in attorney malpractice policies).
41 See Himelstein, supra note 40, at 10 ([I]nsurers seeking exemptions say the
financial impact from thrift-related litigation could simply overwhelm them.").
42 See id. ("[Insurance] industry advocates say the government, with its power and
resources to litigate endlessly, is unlike any other plaintiff."); see also supra note 22
(listing examples of major awards against attorneys and accountants in malpractice
suits brought by regulatory agencies).
43 See Himelstein, supra note 40, at 1 (stating that several states already allow the
exclusions and that others may follow).
44 Mr.John Thomas, FDIC Associate General Counsel in charge of professional
liability matters, states: "'My expectation is that we will attack [the regulatory
exclusions] .... This has the potential to make millions of dollars of difference if
these exclusions are effective in precluding coverage .... The effect would be to
reduce the [government's] net recovery on attorney malpractice cases. Taxpayers
clearly pick up that loss.'" Id. at 10.
45 The discussion is confined to the context of the S&L crisis and its particular
character. But one already finds suggestions that the regulatory exclusion and related
matters may be litigated in wholly different contexts. See, e.g., William S. Biel,
Comment, Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers' Personal Liability for
Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
241, 277-79 (1991) (stating that "[u]nder close comparison, the provisions of the D&O
liability insurance policies' pollution exclusion clauses appear analogous to a
regulatory agency exclusion," and suggesting that the two might share the same fate).
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authority over S&Ls previously held by the FSLIC.46 Specifically,
under FIRREA, the FDIC is empowered in its capacity as receiver or
conservator to resolve the insolvent institution it now controls4 7
and succeed to "all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the
insured depository institution, and of any stockholder, member,
accountholder, depositor, officer or director of such institution with
respect to the institution and [its] assets."48 The FDIC has the
power to "operate the insured depository institution with all the
powers of the members or shareholders, the directors and the
officers," 49 "collect all obligations,"50 and "perform all functions
of the institution. " 51 The FDIC may also repudiate certain burden-
some contracts the S&L entered into before receivership or
conservatorship, 52 and in general terms may enforce the institu-
tion's contracts. 53 The FDIC also must "pay all valid obliga-
tions"54 incurred by the S&L.
In its capacity as receiver or conservator, the FDIC attempts to
recover as much money as possible for the doomed S&L through
director, officer, and other professional liability lawsuits. This
litigation frequently amounts to suing defendants' insurance carriers
directly or suing defendants for the money they may have recovered
from their insurance carriers. Although the FDIC and D&Os are
opponents in D&O duty of care and negligence litigation, they are
pitted together against the insurer in the policy coverage disputes.
This litigation raises the typical legal squabbles encountered in most
insurance coverage cases, whether it be a dispute over an alleged
misrepresentation on the insured's application for insurance,55 or
46 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (Supp. II 1990).
47 See generally Gail & Norton, supra note 13, at 1134-38 (explaining the FDIC's
powers under FIRREA).
48 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1990).49 Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 111990).
50 Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. II 1990).
5' Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. II 1990).
52 See id. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
53 See id. § 1821(e)(12) (Supp. II 1990). This specific provision will be visited
again in this Comment in detail. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
54 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(H) (Supp. II 1990).
55 Insurers may be able to rescind a policy if the insured's policy application
contains a material misrepresentation or an omission of a material fact. See e.g.,
Atlantic Permanent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Casualty Co., 839 F.2d 212,
216-17 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding the particular dishonesty exclusion at issue ambiguous
and requiring ajudgment or adjudication for the exclusion to take effect), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1056 (1988). See generally 12A JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 7291-7305 (rev. ed. 1981 & Supp. 1991) (discussing
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the definition of "claim"56 or "occurrence"5 7 under the policy.
Litigation of these matters turns upon principles established in
prior precedent, thus the fact that the FDIC is involved in this
litigation in the S&L context has not typically created new law. On
the other hand, the issues raised by exclusion litigation are unique
to the D&O insurance coverage cases. This Part will examine these
issues and the cases that raise them.
A. The Insured v. Insured Exclusion Litigation
As stated above, this exclusion denies coverage when one
insured under the policy is the defendant in a liability suit brought
by another person or entity insured under the same policy.
58
Insurers attempt to use this exclusion to deny coverage in suits
brought by the FDIG by arguing that, as receiver or conservator, it
steps into the shoes of the insured S&L59 and thus should likewise
assume the designation of an insured.60 That is, when the FDIC,
representations, including the duty of disclosure, materiality, and fraud).
56 D&O insurance typically does not cover events occurring during the policy
period, but rather covers claims made (and sometimes also reported to the insurer)
during that period. Under a claims-made insurance policy:
[T]he insurer agrees to assume liability for acts or omissions of the type
covered by the policy regardless of when they occurred, if (1) the claim
arising out of the act or omission was made during the policy period, or (2)
notice was given to the insurer within the policy period as to an occurrence
which may subsequently give rise to a claim.
FSLIC v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 & n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). Since the
insurer's liability hinges on whether a "claim" has been made, the scope of the
definition of this term is often a contested matter. See, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v.
FSLIC, 695 F. Supp. 469, 479-80 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that letters from the
FHLBB that imposed restrictions and threatened enforcement action amounted to
a claim).
57 Insurers typically provide reimbursement up to a limit per single loss, making
the definition of a loss (or an "occurrence") also a contested matter. See, e.g., Eureka
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 229, 234-35 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that a single loan policy may have caused multiple loan losses such
that the insurance limit of $20 million should apply to each one of them). A related
issue involves the inclusion of legal defense costs within the stated policy limit. See,
e.g., Burdette, 718 F. Supp. at 660-61 (holding that defense costs should be advanced
as they become due).
58 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. According to the FDIC,
"[n]eedless to say, the FDIC's only interest in this exclusion is to prevent its
illegitimate use against the FDIC or any other receiver, liquidator, or conservator."
FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 103.
59 D&O insurance policies typically also indemnify the S&L itself for the amounts
it is obligated to provide as indemnification for its D&Os. See supra note 2.60 See, e.g., American Casualty Co. v FSLIC, 704 F. Supp. 898, 900 (E.D. Ark. 1989)
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representing the interests of the insured S&L, sues a director or
officer clearly insured under the policy, the exclusion presumably
should be triggered. In reply, the FDIC (and the insured D&Os)
argues that the exclusion is intended to preclude an active and open
S&L from triggering coverage by merely suing one of its executives,
and that, in any case, the FDIC acts not only for the failed institu-
tion but also for the failed S&L's creditors and shareholders, parties
clearly uninsured by the D&O policy.
61
Most courts have held for the FDIC under the insurance law
doctrine of contra proferentum. This doctrine stands for the
proposition that if a certain term or clause in an insurance contract
is found to be ambiguous, that is, subject to more than one reason-
able interpretation, the court chooses the interpretation most
favorable to the insured. Some variation of this doctrine is the law
in every state.62  Therefore, although these cases are decided
under the insurance laws of different states, the analysis is analo-
gous in all the cases.
Specifically, in the context of the D&O insurance policy
litigation, courts have found the insured v. insured exclusion
ambiguous, on the grounds that it is not clear whether federal
regulators should be deemed an insured under the clause. Some
courts have held the clause ambiguous based on the definition of
"insured" provided in the policy.6 3  Usually, though, the court
notes that the FDIC does not merely act as legal successor to the
institution, but also represents the interests of the institution's
shareholders and creditors, and in that capacity it cannot be
deemed an insured under the policy.
64
("American claims that the FSLIC, as receiver, stands in the shoes of [the S&L], for
purposes of the actions against the former officers and directors ... because it...
brought the underlying actions 'for the benefit of [the S&L].' (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1789(b) (1988)).
61 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 29.
62 Ambiguous clauses are to be "liberally construed in favor of a policyholder or
beneficiary thereof, whenever possible, and strictly construed against the insurer in
order to afford the protection which the insured was endeavoring to secure when he
applied for the insurance." 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 55, § 7401 (rev.
ed. 1976 & Supp. 1991).
63 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 765 F. Supp. 538, 548 (D.
Minn. 1991) ("[The] policy definition of Insured includes 'a corporation(s).., and
... subsidiaries .... ' Thus while it is clear that under the policy the [institution] is
an Insured, it is by no means clear that Insured includes the FDIC which took the
bank over as a receiver.") (quoting the policy at issue), aff'd, 968 F.2d 695 (8th Cir.
1992).
' See FDIC v. Zaborac, 773 F. Supp. 137, 144 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that "the
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Only a handful of courts have held the exclusion effective
against the FDIC, accepting the insurers' argument that the FDIC
assumes the failed S&L's posture as an insured under the policy
when it takes control of the institution. In other words, these courts
hold that the exclusion unambiguously bars suits brought by the
institution's receivers or conservators like the FDIC.
65
Thus, it appears that the FDIC is prevailing in the majority of
these suits.' As a result, although insurers have continued to
FDIC does not merely stand in the shoes of [the director or officer], it can also stand
in the shoes of the shareholders"); American Casualty Co. v. Baker, 758 F. Supp.
1340, 1349 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Zandstra, 756 F. Supp. 429, 432
(N.D. Cal. 1990); Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 721 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash.
1989); American Casualty Co. v. FSLIC, 704 F. Supp. 898, 900-02 (E.D. Tenn. 1989);
FDIC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 630 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (W.D. La. 1986); see
also American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 713 F. Supp. 311,316 (N.D. Iowa 1988) ("Courts
which have analyzed the role of FDIC corporate have recognized for over forty years
that the FDIC does not strictly 'step into the shoes' of a failed bank.") (citing
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472-73 (1942) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring)). "FIRREA's codification of the FDIC's succession to the rights and powers of
shareholders and depositors of failed institutions has strengthened the FDIC's
position on this exclusion .... " FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 105 n.128.
A small number of courts take this analysis one step further to argue that the
FDIC does not only bring claims on behalf of depositors, shareholders, and creditors,
but also on behalf of "the [deposit] insurance fund." Branning, 721 F. Supp. at 1184.
As such, the FDIC incurs costs stemming from its statutory responsibility to resolve
the failing institution. Thus, "[any recovery by FDIC in the underlying actions
against the officers and directors is properly understood as a reimbursement for its
loss incurred on behalf of the third parties .... In a very real sense, therefore, it can
be understood as possessing independent claims against the directors and officers."
Zandstra, 756 F. Supp. at 433.
A few of the courts that adopted the FDIC's interpretation of the insured v.
insured exclusion went even further. For example, in Zandstra, the court stated that
the intent behind the insured v. insured exclusion is to prevent collusive suits between
a corporation and its executives, a goal that is wholly inapplicable to federal
regulators. See id. at 431. But see FDIC v. Zaborac, 773 F. Supp. 137, 143 (C.D. Ill.
1991) ("Before a court can start divining the intent behind a clause such as this one,
the Court must determine that the clause was ambiguous.").
65 See Gary v. American Casualty Co., 753 F. Supp. 1547, 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1990)
("FDIC's construction of this exclusion [is] strained and unreasonable."); Mt. Hawley
Ins. Co. v. FSLIC, 695 F. Supp. 469, 483 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The latter case held that
even if the exclusion were ambiguous, the doctrine of reasonable expectations would
not benefit the government. The court stated that the insured executives could not
have reasonably expected that they were being insured against "the consequences of
breaching their duty to the corporation," but presumably only against third-party
suits. Id. at 484.
66 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 104 (indicating that as of September 1991,
the courts held for the insurers in only three out of seventeen cases with a final
decision).
It is notable that the courts did not strike the exclusion or invalidate it on its face
on public policy grounds. The courts simply analyzed the language of the insured v.
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advance this defense in litigation with the FDIC, the insured v.
insured exclusion has lost much of its significance in the S&L
context. For this reason, much of the legal and policy discussion in
this Comment concentrates on the regulatory exclusion.
B. The Regulatory Exclusion
The regulatory exclusion explicitly denies coverage for suits
brought by the FDIC and other regulatory agencies. Accordingly,
the insurers argue that courts cannot possibly hold the exclusion
ambiguous, and should therefore enforce the exclusion as written
to preclude coverage for any suit brought by the FDIC. In the
typical case, the FDIC counters by arguing that the regulatory
exclusion can still be found ambiguous, and thus should be
construed in the insureds' (and thus its own) favor. Alternatively,
if the exclusion is found unambiguous, the FDIC argues it should be
voided altogether on public policy grounds. That is, the FDIC
argues that to allow the exclusion to bar its suit impairs its ability to
represent the failed institution now under its sole control, as well as
the institution's creditors and shareholders-a result that is in
conflict with the FDIC's statutory right and obligation to resolve the
insolvent institution.
67
Like the courts' construction of the insured v. insured exclusion
clause, interpretation of the regulatory clause has varied somewhat.
Some courts have held the wording of the exclusion to be ambigu-
ous. In one case, for example, the court concluded that a policy
excluding coverage for "'any action or proceeding brought by or on
behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation '"' 68 and
similar agencies did not reach an action continued and maintained
by the regulatory agency, but originally filed by the failed institu-
tion.69 Similarly, in another case, interpreting atypical exclusion
language denying coverage for claims due to "'any action or
proceeding resulting from violation of any laws, [or] regulations...
insured exclusion, and concluded that it does not apply to the FDIC. In other words,
the courts did not resort to specific public policy arguments to determine the
effectiveness of the clause. Instead, their analyses adhered to the established
insurance law doctrines that existed when these insurance contracts were negotiated.
The relevance of this point will become clear in the next section in which the case law
interpreting the regulatory exclusion clause is analyzed.
' See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 32.
6 8 American Casualty Co. v. FSLIC, 683 F. Supp. 1183, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(quoting the insurance policy at issue).
69 See id. at 1185.
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as promulgated by [depository institution regulators] or any other
national or state regulatory agency,'" 70 the court held the exclu-
sion ambiguous because it was extremely broad and could be read
as excluding all claims by any litigant-the policy would therefore be
entirely valueless. 71 Most recently, another court held the exclu-
sion to be ambiguous because "it is unclear whether this exclusion
was intended to apply to the FDIC when acting in multiple
capacities," such as depositor, creditor, or shareholder.
72
Most courts, however, have held the regulatory exclusion
unambiguous. Consequently, absent any other ground for its
invalidation, they have applied the exclusion on its terms.73 For
example, in Gary v. American Casualty Co., 74 the court state
Although the language "based upon or attributable to" is
awkward ... the Court finds the FDIC's construction of this
exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. Reading the endorse-
ment as a whole, ... it is clear that the insured's intent was to
exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by
70 American Casualty Co. v. FSLIC, 704 F. Supp. 898, 902 (E.D. Ark. 1989)
(quoting the insurance policy at issue).
71 See id. at 903 & n.5.
72 FDIC v. Mijalis, No. CIV A 89-1316, 1992 WL 172677, at *14 (W.D. La. June
30, 1992).
Another court held the regulatory clause at issue ambiguous because excluding
losses "'based upon or attributable to'" claims brought by a regulatory agency does
not reach the FDIC's actions themselves, but rather reaches other, "secondary" suits
that are somehow based upon the agency's primary actions. FSLIC v. Mmahat, No.
86-5160, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1825, at *3, *6-*7 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1988) (quoting the
policy at issue), afd in part and remanded in part, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1387 (1991). Another district court adopted this reasoning then
subsequently reversed itself. See American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 677 F. Supp. 600,
603-04 (N.D. Iowa 1987), rev'd on this point, No. 86-4018, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6065,
at *50 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1990), affd in part and re'vd in part, 944 F.2d 455 (8th Cir.
1991).
" See FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1355, 1357-60 (M.D. La. 1992); FDIC v.
Zaborac, 773 F. Supp. 137, 141 (C.D. Il1. 1991) ("Clearly, this exclusion was intended
to bar any action brought or maintained by the FDIC ... ."); Powell v. American
Casualty Co., 772 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (W.D. Okla. 1991); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. FDIC, 765 F. Supp. 538, 549 (D. Minn. 1991), affid, 968 F.2d 695 (8th Cir.
1992); American Casualty Co. v. Baker, 758 F. Supp. 1340, 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1991);
Gary v. American Casualty Co., 753 F. Supp. 1547, 1550-51 (W.D. Okla. 1990), affid,
Nos. 91-6147, 91-6148, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20536 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-98 (N.D. Tex. 1989);
McCuen v. International Ins. Co., No. 87-54-D-1, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17624, at *13
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 1988), remanded on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1401 (8th Cir. 1991).
74 753 F. Supp. 1547 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
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or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director
or officer.
75
Similarly, another court held that "[s]imply because the FDIC did
not technically 'bring' this action and is only 'maintaining' this
action does not mean that the FDIC can escape the plain intent of
the regulatory exclusion."
76
Unlike the courts dealing with the insured v. insured exclusion,
a majority of district courts have held the regulatory exclusion
unambiguous. These courts must therefore weigh the merits of the
government's public policy argument. As briefly stated earlier,
77
in the typical regulatory exclusion case, the FDIC argues that
enforcement of the exclusion would impede the fulfillment of the
agency's federal statutory obligation to resolve the insolvent institu-
tion and therefore should be voided on its face.
Three district courts, all prior to the passage of FIRREA, held
that the regulatory exclusion violated public policy and was
therefore void.78 Conversely, two courts explicitly held against the
government. 79  In Branning v. CNA Insurance Cos., the court
reasoned that if the exclusion were valid, "all of [the regulatory
agency's] claims, regardless of their origin or status under the
policy, would not be covered simply because [the agency] ...
prosecuted the claim. Private parties to an insurance contract may
not frustrate the Congressional purpose behind receivership by
annulling [the agency's] federal powers."" In contrast, the court
in Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen asserted that "the most often
found violators of public policy are contracts that induce criminal
conduct or are contrary to statutory law."81 The court explained
that to hold that the exclusion violated public policy requires an
75 Id. at 1550-51 (footnote omitted).
76 Zaborac, 773 F. Supp. at 141.
77 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78 See Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 721 F. Supp. 1180, 1183-84 (W.D. Wash. 1989);
FSLIC v. Mmahat, No. 86-5160, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1825, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 3,
1988), aTd inpart and remandid inpart, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1387 (1991); FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 671 F. Supp. 720, 724 (C.D. Utah 1987).
79 See Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D. Tex.
1989); McCuen v. International Ins. Co., No. 87-54-D-1, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17624,
at *9 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 1988), remanded on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1401 (8th Cir.
1991).80 Branning, 721 F. Supp. at 1184 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1988) and
Oldenburg, 671 F. Supp. at 723).
81 Allen, 710 F. Supp. at 1098 (citing Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue,
223 U.S. 234 (1911) and Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902),
overruled on other grounds by Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940)).
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explicit statutory or regulatory provision prohibiting the exclusion
in D&O policies, or prohibiting banks and S&Ls from buying D&O
policies containing the exclusion.8 2 The court then noted that no
such provision existed, and thus sustained the exclusion against the
government's public policy attack.83
1. The Sixth Circuit Decision
The Sixth Circuit's May 1990 opinion in FDIC v. Aetna Casualty
Surety Co. 84 was the first appellate decision on the enforceabili-
ty of the regulatory exclusion clause. Aetna involved bankers
blanket bonds, a form of insurance policy that insures a financial
institution against losses because of theft or employee dishon-
esty.85 The bonds at issue contained a termination provision
directed specifically at federal banking regulators that, for all
practical purposes, was a regulatory exclusion.86 The Sixth Circuit
rebuffed the FDIC's public policy challenge in two steps. First, the
court held that the existence and meaning of a "public policy" are
to be gleaned from explicit statutory provisions. The court relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Muschany v. United States,
87
which explained that public policy should be "ascertained by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests. As the term 'public
policy' is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law
of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary
to that policy."88 Then, the Sixth Circuit determined that there
was nothing in federal law that conflicted directly with the existence
of the exclusion per se.
89
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning and holding in Aetna has since
been followed by every circuit court90 and most district courts9
82 See id. at 1098-99.
8s See id. at 1099.
84 903 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1990).
85 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 130-44 (providing a general overview and
description of bankers blanket bonds).
86 The bond provided: "This bond shall be deemed terminated or canceled as an
entirety... immediately upon the taking over of the Insured by a receiver or other
liquidator or by State or Federal officials." Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1075 (quoting the bond
at issue) (emphasis omitted).
87 324 U.S. 49 (1945).
88 Id. at 66 (citations omitted).
89 See Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1078.
90 See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Conner, No. 91-2782, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
24337, at *12-*23 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1992); FDIC v. American Casualty Co., Nos. 91-
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that have interpreted D&O regulatory exclusion clauses. The
substance of the Sixth Circuit's analysis, therefore, warrants further
investigation. In Aetna, the Sixth Circuit asserted that no provision
of federal law directly settled the question and discussed in some
detail 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12), the FIRREA provision most relevant
to the question.9 2 It provides:
Authority to enforce contracts.
(A) In general.
The conservator or receiver may enforce any contract, other
than a director's or officer's liability insurance contract or a depository
institution bond, entered into by the depository institution notwith-
standing any provision of the contract providing for termination,
default, acceleration, or exercise of rights upon, or solely by
reason of, insolvency or the appointment of a conservator or
receiver.
(B) Certain rights not affected.
No provision of this paragraph may be construed as impairing
or affecting any right of the conservator or receiver to enforce or
recover under a directors or officers liability insurance contract or
depository institution bond under other applicable law.93
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the D&O insurance proviso in this
provision explicitly allows regulatory exclusion clauses to be
enforced against the FDIC.94
6147, 91-6148, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20536, at *6-*14 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992), aff'g
Gary v. American Casualty Co, 753 F. Supp. 1547 (W.D. Okla. 1990); American
Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 944 F.2d 455, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1991); see also California Union
Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Sav. Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 561-63 (9th Cir. 1991)
(involving a bankers bond).
91 See American Casualty Co. v. Kirchner, No. 91-C-0797-C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15879, at *17 (W.D. Wis. May 22, 1992); FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1355, 1358-
59 (M.D. La. 1992); FDIC v. Zaborac, 773 F. Supp. 137, 141 (C.D. Ill. 1991); Powell
v. American Casualty Co., 772 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (W.D. Okla. 1991); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 765 F. Supp. 538,549 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 695
(8th Cir. 1992); American Casualty Co. v. Baker, 758 F. Supp. 1340, 1345-46 (C.D.
Cal. 1991); Gary v. American Casualty Co, 753 F. Supp. 1547, 1552-53 (W.D. Okla.
1990), aftd, Nos. 91-6147, 91-6148, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20536 (10th Cir. Sept. 1,
1992).
Two courts reached opposite conclusions and specifically held the regulatory
exclusion to be ambiguous. See FDIC v. Mijalis, No. CIV A 89-1316,1992 WL 172677,
at *14 (W.D. La.June 30, 1992); FSLIC v. Heidrick, 774 F. Supp. 352,360-61 (D. Md.
1991).
92 See Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1078-79.
93 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12)(A-B) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
" See Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1078-79.
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This conclusion is readily supportable by an analysis of the
language and structure of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12). In
§ 1821(e)(12)(A), Congress addresses the entire pool of contracts
that were entered into by the depository institution and third
parties before the institution became insolvent and was placed
under the control of a regulatory agency. These contracts may
contain clauses that terminate or delimit the third party's obliga-
tions upon receivership or conservatorship. Section 1821(e)(12)(B),
however, voids these clauses altogether in all contracts that contain
them-with the explicit exception of the D&O insurance contracts
(and the bankers bonds). This does not mean that the FDIC may
never recover under such contracts, however, because § 1821(e)(12)
purports not to disturb other applicable law that may grant the
FDIC the right to recover.
Thus, determining if the regulatory exclusion is ambiguous is
left to the discretion of the courts. The courts may choose to
invalidate an exclusion as contrary to public policy derived from
FIRREA or other statutes, whether federal or state. The Sixth
Circuit declined to do the latter, because its interpretation of
Muschany necessitated that an explicit provision be found in a
statute or regulation, conflicting directly with the regulatory
exclusion. If § 1821(e)(12)(A) did not contain the D&O insurance
proviso, it would have been just such an explicit provision. The
section is clear, however, and the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
exclusion was enforceable. The Sixth Circuit's decision is further
supported by analysis of the legislative history of § 1821(e)(12).
2. The Legislative History of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12)
The issue of public policy and the regulatory exclusion appears
to have been on the minds of both D&O insurers and federal
regulators as Congress struggled to finalize the language of FIRREA.
Both sides seem to have pressed their cases with Congress.95 A
contemporaneous report states that initially, the FDIC and FSLIC
prevailed on the Senate Banking Committee to settle the conflict by
requiring insurers to pay on their policies, regardless of exclusions
95 SeeJerry Knight, A Secret Fight on S&Ls: Regulators, Insurers Battle Over Liability
Issue in Bailout Bill, WASH. PosT, Apr. 30, 1989, at H1 (describing "a secret fight
between federal banking regulators and the insurance and banking industries, with
hundreds of millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money at stake"); Ken Rankin,
Bailout Battle, INS. REV., July 1989, at 9, 10 (describing the lobbying battle between
the FDIC and insurers).
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directed at the government suits.96 Lobbying by insurers followed,
resulting in an uncertain compromise. 97 Congress essentially took
a neutral stand as to the enforceability of regulatory clauses-that is,
Congress avoided deciding the matter, leaving its resolution to the
courts. Congressional intent was not to affect the development of
the law on the subject in either direction. Congressional reports on
FIRREAP8 and the FIRREA debates, 99 both customary sources of
96 See Rankin, supra note 95, at 9-10.
97 See Knight, supra note 95, at H7 ("The language of the House and Senate
amendments is so technical that even lawyers and lobbyists working on the issue
disagree over what it means.... Because the language is so ambiguous, even the
lawyers are reluctant to interpret it.").
98 The Senate report states:
[This provision] does not apply to director's and officer's liability
insurance contracts or to financial institution bonds. The FSLIC and FDIC
have frequently challenged clauses in such contracts or bonds that preclude
the deposit insurer from bringing a claim under the contract or bond,
contending that the clauses are unenforceable. [This provision] remains
neutral regarding such litigation and regarding the FDIC's ability under
other provisions ofState or Federal law, current or future, to pursue claims
on such contracts or bonds. For example, if the law of a particular State
declares limitations on the enforceability of director's and officer's liability
contracts to be void against public policy, the FDIC could pursue a claim on
such a contract under that State's law.
S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1989). A House Committee report
similarly states:
[The proposed provision] allows the conservator or receiver to enforce
contracts that it deems necessary for the orderly execution of its duties as
conservator or receiver, notwithstanding any provision of the contract
providing for the termination, default, acceleration, or exercise of rights
upon, or by reason of, the institution's insolvency or the appointment of a
conservator or receiver, except for directors and officers liability insurance
contracts and financial institution bonds. The legislation retains current law
for such provisions in directors and officers liability insurance contracts and
financial institution bonds.
H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 331 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86,127. Somewhat puzzling is the report's statement that the "majority
of courts which have considered the provisions in contracts which provide that
coverage terminates upon appointment of a receiver have found such provisions to
be against public policy and therefore unenforceable." Id. at 416. The House Report
cites Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 721 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Wash. 1989), and "for a
contrary view," cites Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex.
1989). H.R. REP. No. 54, pt. 1, at 417. At that time, the score was three courts
against the exclusion on public policy grounds, and two for it, finding no public
policy grounds for invalidation. Thus, a majority existed, but it was hardly well-settled
law. It cannot be divined whether the House agrees with this majority or whether the
House is merely consoling the FDIC.
The FIRREA Conference Report does not address this matter. See H.R. REP. No.
209, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
9 Senator Garn (the ranking Republican on the Senate Banking Committee):
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legislative meaning, suggest such congressional intent. That
Congress also instructed the FDIC to explain the advantages and
disadvantages of possible intervention in a formal study1" further
demonstrates that they believed the issue had not been decided.
The legislative history of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12) lends support to
the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the provisions of FIRREA do not
explicitly establish any "public policy" against regulatory exclusions.
C. Pending Exclusion Litigation and Legislation
As stated previously, the holding and reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit has been widely followed.1" 1 The trend in the courts is
that the FDIC has successfully litigated most of the insured v.
insured clause cases, while losing the majority of the regulatory
exclusion cases. Nevertheless, the state of the law in this area
remains in flux. Despite its recent setbacks, the FDIC shows no sign
of abandoning the issue. Indeed, cases involving the validity of the
regulatory exclusion are pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, 10 2 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit."'5 A case is also pending before the Supreme
Court of Colorado.
1°4
Additional litigation is likely to compound further the uncertain-
ty in the law. Another source of uncertainty is the necessary
With respect to directors' and officers' liability insurance contracts,
there has been a substantial split in the decisions relating to the validity of
regulatory exclusion clauses that prohibit[] a regulator from enforcing rights
under the contract.
It is not the intent of the conferees to influence these decisions, or to
affect the development of case law or statutory provisions relating to the
validity of these clauses and director and officer liability insurance contracts
or fidelity or indemnity bonds. The intent of the conferees is to remain
neutral on these matters.
135 CONG. REC. S10,198 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Garn) (citations
omitted).
Senator Riegle (Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee): "[T]he managers'
amendment excludes director and officer liability insurance and financial institution
bond policies from the scope of this provision, and instead directs the FDIC to study
this issue and report back to the Congress with legislative recommendations ....
135 CONG. REC. S4278 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
100 See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 454. The mandated study has been
released. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14.
101 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
102 See FDIC v. Zaborac, No. 91-3597 (7th Cir. argued Oct. 20, 1992).
103 See FSLIC v. Heidrick, No. 92-1447 (4th Cir. argued Oct. 27, 1992).
104 FDIC v. Bowen, 824 P.2d 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert granted, FDIC v.
American Casualty Co., 1992 Colo. LEXIS 103 (Jan. 27, 1992).
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interaction in these cases between federal courts and state law.
While most of the cases are litigated in federal district courts, it is
state insurance law that is applied and interpreted." 5 The unpre-
dictability is compounded by the recent command handed down by
the United States Supreme Court in Salve Regina College v. Rus-
sell1°6 that circuit courts of appeal must review de novo the
district courts' determinations of state law, rather than deferring to
the lower courts' determinations.10 7 In addition, litigation on
D&O insurance policies in general and the exclusions in particular
has already begun in some states108 and will likely continue,
potentially creating a rich variety of holdings.
If the recent trend in regulatory exclusion litigation continues,
the FDIC may go back to Congress to seek redress, as it has
attempted in the past. The FDIC recommended in its September
1991 report to Congress that section 1821(e)(12) be amended, and
appropriate legislative history supplied, to declare clearly that
Congress finds the regulatory exclusion to be a violation of public
policy.109 After the FDIC's report was released, an amendment
to a then-pending banking bill was introduced, proposing to imple-
ment the FDIC's request. The amendment was defeated after
intense lobbying by insurers. 110 The FDIC continues to show
interest in a legislative solution to its courtroom difficulties.
111
105 Notions such as contract ambiguity, strict construction of ambiguous clauses
against the insurer, and reasonable expectations of the insured are notions of state
law, which, while similar across the states, are not necessarily identical.
106 111 S. Ct. 1217 (1991).
107 See id. at 1221. The justification for this deference was that district judges
presumably have a better ability than the circuits to gauge what state law is or will be
after litigating a large number of diversity suits in the states where they sit. See id. at
1221-25. This de novo review will tend to increase the layers of uncertainty. In
addition to district court conflict, circuit conflict may yet be introduced as more
circuit courts take up the exclusion issue for decision, fulfilling their newly mandated
duty to review lower state law determinations. Seesupra notes 102-05 and accompany-
ing text. Perhaps a circuit court will have to visit the issue multiple times, once for
every state within the circuit.
108 See e.g., FDIC v. Bowen, 824 P.2d 41, 45-45 (Colo. Ct App. 1991) (sustaining
a regulatory exclusion), cert. granted, FDIC v. American Casualty Co., 1992 Colo.
LEXIS 103 (Jan. 27, 1992).
109 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, at 19-23 (detailing the FDIC's recommen-
dations).
o10 See John F. Olson &Josiah 0. Hatch, Back Into the Game of Backing the Banks,
THE RECORDER, Mar. 18, 1992, at 10; Sherry R. Sontag, Law Puts FDIC's Claims in
Peril, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 45 (stating that when amendments were
introduced, industry lobbyists descended on Congress like a "sea of blue suits"). The
amendment was proposed by Rep. Richard H. Baker (R., La.). See id. at 47.
111 For example, see Hea ringof the General Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
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Thus, it is always possible that Congress may act on the FDIC's
recommendation to amend FIRREA.
III. A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY EXCLUSION
In the past year or so, the insurers have gained an edge in
regulatory exclusion litigation, making this exclusion the likely
preferred tool insurers will use to prevent the FDIC from recovering
on the D&O policies of the S&L executives.1 12 The FDIC takes
the position that the regulatory exclusion is against public poli-
cy.113 This final Part of the Comment analyzes the regulatory
exclusion from a policy standpoint in relation to insurance econom-
ics as applied to the S&L context, taking a somewhat broad look at
why exclusions aimed at the FDIC exist. This discussion is directed
at the courts that have to decide on the validity of the regulatory
exclusion 114 as well as Congress, which may find it impossible to
directly avoid the issue.
1 15
of the House Banking Committee, Fed. News Serv., Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fednew File ("We have vigorously opposed the regulatory exclusion.
We believe that it is contrary to public policy because it hinders our efforts. Indeed,
it frustrates our congressional mandate to maximize recoveries from those who cause
losses.. . .") (testimony of the FDIC's General Counsel Alfred Byrne).
112 Because courts have almost universally construed the insured v. insured
exclusion against insurers claiming it as a defense to regulatory suits, it will not be
pursued further in this Comment as a possible avenue of defense for insurers. To the
extent the courts may begin to allow insurers to claim successfully an insured v.
insured exclusion defense, however, the discussion in Part III is relevant to an analysis
of that exclusion as well.
113 See supra text accompanying note 67.
The FDIC has also argued that regulatory exclusions should be invalid by analogy
to automatic termination clauses under the Bankruptcy Code. See FDIC REPORT,
supra note 14, at 118-126. The Bankruptcy Code invalidates contract clauses that
render the contract void upon insolvency or filing for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 365(e)(1), 541(c) (1988). By analogy, the FDIC argues in its report to Congress
that "[tihere is no sound policy reason for distinguishing an FDIC receivership from
a bankruptcy proceeding in a way that wouldjustify the enforceability of termination
on appointment clauses or regulatory exclusions against the FDIC." FDIC REPORT,
supra note 14, at 124. The analysis below shows why the regulatory exclusion should
be treated differently as a matter of insurance economics and policy.
114 The courts appear to be aware of the implications of ruling on what might be
otherwise seen as a mundane contractual dispute. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co.
v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (N.D. Tex. 1989) ("[T]he Court recognizes the
magnitude of its decision due to the apparent widespread use of such [exclusions]
and the current banking situation in the Southwest area of the country.").
115 A clear congressional command in this area would be welcome to prevent
continued costly litigation. A substantial portion of the FDIC's recoveries is spent on
the FDIC's private litigators. See Legal Division, supra note 21, at 903 (stating that the
FDIC's legal expenses in 1991 exceeded $1 billion). Insurer legal costs are probably
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This section begins with a description of the origin and purpose
of the regulatory exclusion clause, then moves to a consideration of
basic principles of insurance economics as they apply in the D&O
context. The argument in essence is that there are fundamental and
compelling reasons why private insurers should not be denied the
enforceability of the regulatory exclusion clauses. Without these
clauses, insurers are deemed to have insured risks they would have
extreme difficulty insuring. The section concludes by briefly setting
out what might be termed a fundamental fairness argument against
mulcting the pockets of insurers simply because they are deep.
A. The Origin of the Regulatory Exclusion and the
Nature of the Excluded Liability
S&L managers have not always been subject to the risk of suit
with the frequency that is seen today. As will be discussed in
greater detail below, until the early 1980s, S&Ls were subject to very
strict governmental regulation and control, allowing only a narrow
amount of management discretion.116 Indeed, it was possible in
a 1983 article on S&Ls to enumerate and discuss individually every
government negligence suit against S&L executives. 117 Relaxation
of regulatory constraints in the early 1980s, however, provided S&L
of similar caliber. In addition, insurers must act with the expectation that there is a
possibility that they will have to pay on claims they attempted to exclude. Under the
current situation, the FDIC is unable either to predict its expected recoveries to
evaluate its investment in litigation or to determine the optimal uses of its limited
resources. Likewise, insurers are induced neither to withdraw their coverage
altogether (which insurers state they would do if the regulatory exclusion is no longer
effectively available), see FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, app. A at 6-11, nor to refrain
from passing on the increased cost of possible payouts and legal and related costs to
some or all of their insureds. This is why, after the Eighth Circuit sustained a
regulatory exclusion in American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 944 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991),
Aetna President Stephen Sills commented: "It interjects a larger element of certainty
in the policies we're writing. If we put a regulatory exclusion in a policy... we now
have a higher degree of certainty that it'll hold up." Appeals Court Rules Against FDIC
on Regulatoiy Exclusion in D&O Policy, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 526, 526
(Sept. 30, 1991).
16 S&Ls were required to invest primarily in home mortgages, a relatively safe,
stable, albeit restrictive, asset base. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.117 See Daniel J. Goldberg, Directors' and Officers' Liability in the Wake of Deregu.
lation, 49 LEGAL BULL. 297, 308-10 & n.35 (1983) (published by the United States
League of Savings Institutions); see also Lyle W. Sparks, A Review of Directors' and
Officers' Liability Insurance for Savings Institutions, 51 LEGAL BULL. 101, 120 (1985)
("Instances of threatened claims by regulators are rare except when criminal activity
or self-dealing is apparent.... Certainly, there is no guarantee that regulators will
not sue directors for simple negligence in the future .... ").
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executives with unprecedented investment opportunities. 118 The
result was greater opportunities not only for S&L profits, but also
for losses. The potential for catastrophe was perceptively laid out
by one commentator in 1983:
The new deregulated business environment provides savings
institutions with more flexibility to pursue business opportunities
once unavailable to them .... Presumably, those business opportu-
nities offer the potential of greater profitability for savings
institutions. But along with those new opportunities and that
profit potential, directors and officers of savings institutions face
new risks. In the new competitive environment, directors, who
previously had to oversee management policies of a highly
regulated financial institution, may be exposed to unfamiliar
liability risks. Officers, whose previous day-to-day management
functions involved the implementation of policies formulated by
directors implementing regulatory edict, now have additional
duties that call for a close and vigilant analysis of market and
competitive forces. Prior to deregulation, it was as if the Bank
Board and the FSLIC acted as directors, attended board meetings
of savings institutions, and exercised a large measure of control
over the business of savings institutions.... If the regulators
return to the board room of a savings institution, it will be because
they are responding to a savings institution that finds itself in
trouble and requires extraordinary relief available only from the
Bank Board and the FSLIC. 19
The worst fears of industry experts have now proven true. Federal
regulators have repeatedly returned to S&L boardrooms to impose
enormous liabilities on those D&Os whose negligence or outright
fraud contributed to S&L failures.
When taking control of an insolvent S&L, the FDIC faces
massive costs. A recent analysis of available data indicated that the
government's average cost of closing an insolvent S&L in 1987 was
approximately 35% of the institution's total assets.120 Using this
figure, it has been estimated that the average resolution cost per
118 For a summary of these changes see JAMES R. BARTH & MICHAEL G. BRADLEY,
THRiFr DEREGULATION AND FEDERAL DEPosrr INSURANCE 5-6 (Federal Home Loan
Bank Board Research Paper No. 150, 1988).
119 Goldberg, supra note 117, at 297-98; see also EDWARDJ. KANE, THE GATHERING
CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 145 (1985) ("Unregulated risks are not only
subsidized, they are largely unfunded. The burden of backing up FDIC and FSLIC
guarantees falls implicitly on the general taxpayer....").
120 See Barth & Brumbaugh, supra note 16, at 61. The average resolution cost
declined slightly in 1988 to 31%. See id.
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institution is $180 million.1 21 This estimate may already be
obsolete, however, as recent data indicates even higher closing costs
per institution.122 Regardless of the exact estimate, it is clear that
the government's business of insuring deposits against the possibili-
ty of the S&Ls' insolvency has proven to be an extremely costly
undertaking.
To help relieve the enormous burden on the government's
deposit insurance fund, federal regulators have pursued those
parties who both contributed to S&L failures and have substantial
assets. Because of its limited resources, the FDIC only files claims
against targets that have sufficient assets to cover both the FDIC's
and the target's defense costs, and still have a reasonable surplus
remaining to alleviate a portion of the government's deposit
insurance liability. The existence of a D&O insurance policy is
pivotal in that it increases D&Os' assets substantially, making it
more likely that the FDIC will bring suit in the event of an insolven-
cy. 123 A D&O insurer, therefore, can expect that when an S&L
becomes insolvent its risk exposure will increase exponentially.
124
As federal regulators enter the picture, suits against insurers will
multiply both in size and frequency.
125
121 See id. (estimating the aggregate cost of closing 519 S&Ls then insolvent to be
between $91 and $102 billion).
122 See id. The most recent congressional action on deposit insurance and
depository institution regulation allows the FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund, a much
healthier entity than its S&L counterpart, to borrow about $70 billion to replenish
itself. See Stephen Labaton, Bank Aid Is Called Insufflcient: U.S. Auditor Warns of
Future Failure, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1991, at DI. Butjust as the law went into effect,
the Comptroller General raised doubts regarding the adequacy of even that amount.
See id.
123 A 1989 internal FDIC memo indicated that D&Os with less than $5 million in
available assets would typically not be sued. SeeJustice Should Look to More Civil Than
Criminal Cases in Dealing with S&L Fraud, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 226, 227
(July 2, 1990).
124 See Albert B. Crenshaw, Cutting Costs in the Thrift Cleanup: U.S. Seeks to Recover
Some Losses from Insurers, but Effort Could Deal Severe Blow to Industry, WASH. POST,
Aug. 19, 1990, at HI; Sabin Russell, ThriftlIndustry Woes May Hurt Insurance Firms, S.F.
CHRON., July 25, 1990, at C1.
125 Insurers, in any case, are typically obligated to pay for their insureds' defense
costs. See, e.g., FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, app. B (reproducing the Directors and
Officers Insurance and Company Reimbursement Policy from the National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, which provides for coverage of defense costs).
Because defense costs are included within the policy limits even if the FDIC recovers
nothing in its suit, an insurer will have incurred these costs. This means that,
assuming coverage, insurers of S&L executives expect not only to be liable often, but
to pay for defense costs even more frequently as well. Increased litigation with
regulators also increases the possibility of insurers being sued by their insureds for
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The regulatory exclusion was created by D&O insurers in the
early 1980s to offset this risk. 12 6 It is unusual in that it excludes
all suits brought by particular claimants-FSLIC, FDIC, and other
regulatory agencies-rather than a narrow class of claims within all
suits. By excluding all regulatory actions from coverage, insurers
refused to insure against the enormous liabilities inherent in the
specific monstrous event that was most likely to cause regulators to
bring suits-an S&L's insolvency. Regulatory exclusions effectively
limited the exposure of insurers to D&O negligence and fraud up
to the point of the S&L's total collapse, but no further.
There is strong evidence that D&O conduct violating both state
and federal law was widespread, 127 suggesting that the FDIC's
suits for fraud and negligence following insolvency will typically be
meritorious. D&O insurers had the foresight, however, to limit
their obligation to such suits through the regulatory exclusion.
Basic principles of insurance economics demanded the creation of
this exclusion, and continue to argue for its enforceability. Those
principles can now be explored.
B. The Pooling Problem
The mere fact that a certain predicted liability is large does not
mean that it is uninsurable. Thus, just because D&O insurers could
predict in the early 1980s that insuring the management decisions
of insolvent S&Ls would be very costly does not mean, by itself, that
such insurance could not be provided at some price. However,
there are additional prerequisites of an insurable risk that make
D&O insurance in the context of the S&L industry a very difficult
proposition. This section will explain one such fundamental of
insurance-the necessity of risk "pooling." Before explaining how
this principle is applicable to the S&L context, this section will
demonstrate pooling's extreme importance by demonstrating its
bad faith denial of coverage. See Lavet, supra note 28, at 212. For a general
discussion of bad faith litigation, see WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD
FArrH LrTIGATION (1991).
126 See Sparks, supra note 117, at 120 n.64 ("In view of the approach taken in
[recent enforcement litigation], it appears somewhat disingenuous of regulators to
profess they do not understand why D&O carriers are seeking to impose exclusions
for suits by regulators.").
127 See ADAMS, supra note 20, at 22 (asserting that fraud was rampant among
D&Os of failed S&Ls); MAYER, supra note 20, at 7-8 (asserting that fraudulent
accounting practices were used by many S&L managers).
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utility in analyzing an important insurance-related phenomenon, the
insurance crisis of the mid-1980s.
128
As one commentator has stated, insurance provides "a method
for individuals to equalize the amount of money available to them
over diverse states of the world-states in which losses occur and
those in which there are no losses." 12 Most persons and entities
are risk-averse, and therefore wish to prevent the possible severe
consequences of an unpredictable loss of low probability.130 In
a perfect insurance scenario, the risk-averse entity passes on its risk
to an insurer-a risk-neutral party-along with a premium. The
insurer is risk-neutral when it insures risks of a stochastic or
"probabilistic" character. 1 ' An insurer "could not sell guarantees
of future protection without some estimate of future losses."
132
The insurer estimates its future obligations within a narrow range
by insuring a large pool of insureds with similar expected risks. In
creating these pools of insureds, insurers rely on the "Law of Large
Numbers," which provides that as the number of insureds with
identical risks increases, the total expected loss for the insurer
equals the number of insureds multiplied by the expected loss for
an individual insured.133 Thus, in the ideal case, an insurer could
predict its future obligations with certainty.3 4 An insured's
premium would then be equal to the cost of the risk insured against
multiplied by its probability.
13 5
It is important that the size of the expected loss for each insured
within a certain pool be reasonably uniform. This uniformity is vital
for two reasons. First, it enables the insurer to predict its future
liabilities. 136 Second, uniformity allows the insurer to control the
128 See infra notes 14147 and accompanying text.
12 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1539 (1987).
130 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 63 (1988).
131 Sic Priest, supra note 129, at 1539-40.
132 ROBERT RIEGEL ET AL., INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: PROPERTY AND
LIABILITy 17 (6th ed. 1976).
133 See id. at 18-20; Priest, supra note 129, at 1540.
'" In reality, two factors, moral hazard and adverse selection, cause deviations
from the ideal based not on the dissimilarity of insured risks within the pool but on
informational problems. Moral hazard is the tendency of an insured to take more
risk once insured. Adverse selection is the tendency of those who know they face
higher risks to acquire insurance. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 130, at 65-67
(further delineating the moral hazard and adverse selection concepts).
I5 To this figure, however, must be added a risk premium, plus the insured's
share of the insurer's administrative costs and profit, less the insured's share of the
insurer's investment income.
i36 See RIEGEL et al., supra note 132, at 20 ("The losses of an insurance company
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problem of adverse selection, or the "tendency of persons with
relatively greater exposure to risk to seek insurance protec-
tion."1 17 Controlling this phenomenon is crucial to the viability
of the pool of insureds, since the size of the pool makes the
application of the Law of Large Numbers possible. The premium
an insured pays constitutes the insured's share of the risks possessed
by all members of her risk pool. If the pool comprises both high-
risk and low-risk insureds, the premium required from a low-risk
insured would be disproportionate to the risk she brings to the
pool, and consequently she will have an incentive to abandon the
pool. 138 "Obviously, as low-risk members drop out, a pool will
consist more predominantly of high-risk members, requiring the
premium to be raised and placing greater pressure on the remaining
low-risk members of the pool."13 9 At the limit, the pool may
unravel altogether.
140
The principles of risk pool segregation and disintegration are
crucial in analyzing the insurance crisis of the mid-1980s. This crisis
occurred when premiums increased and policy limits and overall
coverage decreased in Commercial General Liability (CGL) and
medical malpractice insurance.14 1 Commentators have debated
the causes of these changes and several theories have emerged.
142
could not be expected to remain uniform if it insured 500,000 insureds for $1 each
and five insureds for $100,000 each. A few losses on the latter would be sufficient
to upset all the calculations that could be made.").
157 Priest, supra note 129, at 1541.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 See id. at 1542. The extra cost of risk variance is another consequence of not
having narrow risk pools. Two pools may have the same average risk, yet one may
have a greater degree of variation and dissimilarity among its individual risks. The
latter pool is more costly to insure because more diversification (through investment
and reinsurance) is required. Accordingly, the premium increases. See id. Again the
increased cost of the premiums enhances the possibility of insurance pool disintegra-
tion.
141 See Richard N. Clarke et al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An
Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 367-68 (1988); Priest, supra note 129, at
1521-22. CGL coverage insures a corporation or other entity against its liability to
third parties. Products liability is a prime example of this type of liability.
142 For a sampling, see Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the
McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance
Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 402-06, 415 (1988) (arguing that the insurance
industry's antitrust exemption caused the dramatic rate increases and refusals of
coverage); Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation:
Assessing Our Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 272, 292-93 (Peter Schuck ed., 1991)
(concluding that increased tort liability affected the insurance crisis and that state tort
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Some have argued that at least one contributor to the crisis was the
dynamic change in areas of tort liability law,14 including expan-
sion of substantive liability standards, the contraction of available
defenses, 14 and the increase in the variety and magnitude of non-
economic damages. 45 These changes have caused an increase
not only in the amount of the average damage award, but also in the
volatility and variability of those awards. This causal relationship is
borne out by empirical studies. 146  These data support the posi-
reforms addressed much of the problem); Clarke et al., supra note 141, at 369
(maintaining that unpredictable changes in tort liability spurred the insurance crisis);
MichaelJ. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American
Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 929, 929-33 (1987) (illustrating how attempts to achieve social insurance by the
Canadian tort system and its American counterpart debilitated the liability insurance
industry); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics ofCompetitive lnsurance
Markets, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 455,457 (1988) (rejecting the antitrust exemption theory
and adopting the tort rationale).
14 Products liability law is one area of the law that was particularly affected. See
W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 147,
176-77 (1991) (demonstrating that product liability claims have increased).
144 See Priest, supra note 129, at 1535-36.
145 See id. at 1553-55.
146 These studies are reviewed in Scott Harrington & Robert E. Litan, Causes of the
Liability Insurance Crisis, 239 SCIENCE 737, 740-41 (1988). See also Blackmon &
Zeckhauser, supra note 142, at 292 (concluding in an empirical study that state law
changes in joint and several liability and the imposition of caps on nonpecuniary
damages have increased the availability and decreased the cost of insurance).
An analysis of a recent suit by several states against a group of insurance
companies, alleging state and federal antitrust law violations, also demonstrates the
importance of narrow, uniform risk pooling. See In reInsurance Antitrust Litig., 723
F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The suits claimed
that the insurers had, inter alia, collusively decided to exclude pollution coverage
from typical CGL policies. See id. at 469. Leaving aside the merits of the suit's
antitrust claims, several commentators have argued that these "collusive" actions were
insurers' attempts at segregating low-risk from high-risk insureds: the "exclusion of
pollution coverage from the basic policy serves [the] segregation purpose and reduces
differences in risk (reduces risk variance) between members of the pool because it
makes all insureds within the pool equivalent with respect to potential pollution
claims." George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance,
63 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1029 (1989). As in the area of medical malpractice and CGL
insurance, pollution claims have given rise to enormous liabilities in recent years. See
generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988) (describing the potential burden on CGL insurers); Bid,
supra note 45, at 246 (describing the expansion of D&O environmental liability and
the potential burden on D&O insurers). The pollution exclusion was created by
insurers to "prevent[] the prospective costs ofpollution from being averaged into the
premiums of non-polluters." Priest, supra, at 1029.
Indeed, a Department of the Treasury report in 1982 addressed the feasibility
of private insurance for corporate financial responsibility for hazardous waste disposal
facilities. It answered the question in the negative, stating that the "major insurability
1992]
578 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:547
tion that increased variability and unpredictability of damage awards
(and correspondingly, the liabilities of insurers) has made it
exceedingly difficult for insurers to define and maintain narrow,
uniform risk pools. Those insureds who perceive their risk to be
small, or who find cheaper ways to insure themselves (for example,
through self-insurance) exit the pool, leaving those who remain
facing higher premiums. The cycle of disintegration will continue
as the lower-risk members remaining in the pool are also inclined
to exit.
14 7
The application of the risk-pool segregation concept to the D&O
liability insurance context is straightforward. If D&O insurers could
not add a regulatory exclusion to the policies they underwrote, they
would have to pool the insured S&L directors and officers with all
other insured D&Os, spreading the expected liabilities among the
total pool membership. In such a case, the monumental liabilities
that S&L directors and officers face when the institution becomes
insolvent would shift the average of the risks in the D&O pool,
thereby inducing insurers to raise the premium charged for the
entire pool. Low-risk D&Os would have an incentive to withdraw
into cheaper insurance schemes (perhaps self-insurance) where their
premiums would not be subsidizing higher-risk insurers. Thus, if
insurers did not exclude coverage of D&Os of insolvent S&Ls, the
enormous and unpredictable liabilities imposed by them would
threaten the general D&O insurance pool with disintegration. The
availability of D&O insurance, itself, is therefore at stake in the
exclusion clause litigation. If insurers are not permitted to
segregate risks, then insurance for these risks will be in jeopardy.
Without the exclusion, the D&Os of healthy institutions that do not
face a serious insolvency risk, and the D&Os of weaker institutions
that, in addition to the risk of insolvency, face other insurable risks,
will have difficulty obtaining insurance for those risks.
148
problem under [the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)] has to do with the particular combina-
tion of liability and financial responsibility provisions which tend to render the
liability exposure of the insurer too uncertain for traditional underwritingpractices."
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABLnY INSURANCE at v
(1982).
147 See Priest, supra note 129, at 1564-66; John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and
the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1830-33 (1987). For some,
insurance becomes so expensive that the insured product or service cannot be priced
so that it will be bought by sufficient numbers of consumers to make it profitable,
resulting in product or service withdrawals. See id. at 1851 n.108.
148 See Crenshaw, supra note 124, at H4. See generally Priest, supra note 129, at
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C. The Independent Risk Problem and the Question of
Private Insurability
Assume that insurers could not pool the risks imposed by S&L
directors and officers with the risks imposed by D&Os in general.
Insurers may therefore consider issuing insurance policies to S&L
directors and officers as a separate risk pool, charging them a
higher premium in accordance with the higher risk they pose. This
section argues that if D&O insurers cannot enforce regulatory
exclusions in these policies, insurers will not insure the D&O risks
incident to insolvency at all. The biggest risk S&L directors and
officers impose is the risk of FDIC suits to recover lost deposits as
the institutions they run fail. Insuring S&L directors and officers
without a regulatory exclusion, however, would amount to private
insurance companies providing deposit insurance. That is, D&O
insurers, without the benefit of the regulatory exclusion, would be
forced to insure claims filed both by S&Ls against their own D&Os,
and also by federal regulators to recover depositors' funds after the
institution has gone into receivership. 149 Privately insuring S&L
deposits would be difficult, if not impossible, because the risks
carried by the pool of insureds-here, the S&L directors and
officers-would be apt to occur together. This would violate a
fundamental principle of insurance economics-that insured risks be
independent. This section will explain the independence principle
and its importance, best illustrated by the failure of three private
deposit insurance schemes in Rhode Island, Ohio, and Maryland.
The section concludes that if forced to cover claims incident to
insolvency, D&O insurers stand to suffer the same fate as these
private deposit insurance companies.
A viable pool of insureds requires not only that the risks insured
against be reasonably uniform but also that they be indepen-
dent. 150 Independence mandates that the occurrence of one loss
1571-76 (discussing the effect of increased variance on provider risk pools).
149 This assertion is not entirely true, of course, because D&O insurers would not
have to pay for insolvencies resulting from market conditions or other factors not
related to the competence or prudence of the D&Os. Still, the FDIC has been
vigorously pursuing cases where recovery may be possible. Litigation is likely to
increase if courts continue to hold that the standard to which D&Os should be held
is one of simple, not gross, negligence. The majority of courts that considered the
question found that simple negligence was the proper standard. See Cindy A.
Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement of the Financial
Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 17 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 1993)
(manuscript at 23-31, 53, on file with author).
150 SeeJAMES R. BARTH ET AL., REFORMING FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE: WHAT
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insured against must not affect the probability of the occurrence of
a second loss. 5 ' An insurer cannot insure events apt to occur in
high numbers at the same time, rather than being spread out over
time. Only if risks are independent can an insurer "accumulate
small premiums from each insured and still have funds sufficient in
any period to pay those losses that actually occur."15 2 A possibili-
ty that there may be a catastrophic loss across the risk pool makes
insurance of the pool itself impossible.
153
Deposit insurance, or by analogy, D&O insurance for claims
incident to insolvency, does not meet this criterion.154 Recent
experience with private deposit insurance in Rhode Island, Ohio,
and Maryland is illustrative of the difficulty of privately insuring
against S&L insolvencies. In November 1990, a small, two-branch
bank in Providence, Rhode Island, failed. The bank's deposits were
not insured by the government, but by a private insurance company,
The Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Fund (RISDIF).
RISDIF exhausted much of its reserves in reimbursing depositors
for their lost money.155 Because of impending trouble at other
institutions insured by RISDIF, RISDIF requested the state to take
over and control its operations, signaling the end of its busi-
ness. 15 6 The state closed the institutions insured by RISDIF as it
attempted to generate the funds necessary to back up the deposits
held in these institutions.157  These deposits remained frozen
until a $150 million bailout bond issue produced sufficient funds to
refund depositors most of their money.
158
The Rhode Island events were similar to earlier S&L failures in
other states. In March of 1985, after a securities-trading firm
CAN BE LEARNED FROM PRIVATE INSURANCE PRACTICES? 13 (1989); EMMETT J.
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 29 (5th ed. 1989); Priest, supra
note 129, at 1540.
151 See Priest, supra note 129, at 1540 n.98.
152 Id. at 1540.
153 See BARTH ET AL., supra note 150, at 13 n.13 ("The risk of being unemployed"
is another risk that does not satisfy [the independence] characteristic. The
government, therefore, provides unemployment insurance."); Priest, supra note 129,
at 1540 ("Thus, losses from nuclear war are uninsurable.").
154 See BARTH ET AL., supra note 150, at 12-13.
'
55 See Keith Bradsher, 45 Credit Unions and Banks Shut by Rhode Island, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1991, at Al, D2.
156 See id.
157 See id. at Al. According to then FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman, RISDIF's
failure was "'one of the largest we've seen in several decades.'" Id. at D2 (quoting
Seidman).158 See Rhode Island Gets Bank Bailout Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991, § 1, at 32.
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collapsed, a state-chartered Ohio S&L stood to lose millions of
dollars, placing the security of its deposits at grave risk.159 The
threat of this collapse precipitated a panic among depositors, and
a run on both healthy and unhealthy S&Ls, 160 putting tremendous
pressures on the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund, a non-profit private
deposit insurance company.161 To end the run, the Ohio Gover-
nor ordered all seventy-one privately insured institutions closed, a
decision that left many depositors without cash until the end of the
crisis.16 2 The state authorized an emergency deposit insurance
fund while the institutions at risk began purchasing federal deposit
insurance.
1 6 3
About eight weeks after the Ohio failures, Maryland's S&Ls
found themselves wallowing in the same murky waters. A change in
the top management of the state's second largest S&L and press
reports that the institution had grown too rapidly'64 caused a run
on that institution and others insured by the private Maryland
Savings Share Insurance Corporation (MSHIC). 165  Unable to
meet the demands of insured depositors, MSHIC was on the verge
of collapse. Maryland's Governor, invoking his emergency powers,
ordered all 102 institutions privately insured by MSHIC to limit
withdrawals to $1000 per month.166 The Maryland state legisla-
ture responded by granting the Governor further S&L regulatory
powers, and by requiring that all qualifying institutions apply for
federal deposit insurance.1 67 For those S&Ls too small to qualify
for federal insurance, a state insurance fund was created.
168
159 See Kenneth N. Gilpin & Todd S. Purdum, Ohio Legislator Fights to Protect
Deposits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1985, at D2.160 See Gary Klott, 71 Ohio Savings Institutions Shut for3 Days in Effort to Stem Run,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1985, at 1 ("At several institutions in the Cincinnati area, long
lines of depositors, many of whom had camped out overnight, had already formed
outside the banks [before state-ordered temporary shutdowns].").
161 See Gilpin & Purdum, supra note 159, at D2.
162 See Klott, supra note 160, at 3.
163 See id.
164 See Eric N. Berg, Maiyland Enacts Laws on Thrif Units' Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 1985, at 35.161 See Eric N. Berg, Mayland Limits All Withdrawalsfrom Thrifi Units, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 1985, at Al.
166 See id.
167 See Berg, supra note 164, at 35. The week before the action of the state
legislature, the Federal Reserve Bank already had tripled the amount of money lent
to the Maryland S&Ls. See id. at 38.
1 See id. Interestingly, this state agency, the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund,
ended up facing massive losses similar to the FSLIC's and the FDIC's losses on a
national level, and also became involved in regulatory exclusion litigation with D&O
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The demise of private deposit insurance systems in these three
states dramatically illustrates the impossibility of privately insuring
risks that are not independent. Insurers have great incentive to
avoid or minimize their exposure to risks that are not independent
enough to avert multiple catastrophic claims on the insurance
fund.169 The regulatory exclusion is a legitimate tool used by
D&O insurers to minimize exposure to such risks.
D. The Moral Hazard Problem and the Need for
Governmental Regulation
This section explains why, compared to the federal government,
private insurers are less capable of insuring claims incident to
insolvency. As will be demonstrated, only the government can
prevent the excessive risk-taking to the extent necessary for this
D&O insurance. Such insurance is viable only if certain measures
are taken to prevent excessive risk-taking--measures that only the
federal government can effectively take.
insurers. See Finci v. American Casualty Co., 593 A.2d 1069, 1076-79 (Md. 1991)
(holding that regulatory exclusions are not invalid on public policy grounds), revg,
579 A.2d 281 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
Privately insured institutions in other states were also moving toward purchasing
federal insurance. By mid-1985, all of North Carolina's institutions had applied for
federal coverage; Massachusetts S&Ls followed closely behind. See Nathaniel C. Nash,
Washington Watch: Private Deposit Insurance Bills, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1985, at D2.
Indeed, it appears that RISDIF, the Rhode Island private insurance scheme, was
the last private entity to insure any depository institution other than credit unions.
See Michael Quint, About 10% of Credit Unions Are Privately Insured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 1991, at D4 (listing the remaining private deposit insurers that insure only credit
unions). Credit unions are tightly regulated creatures with little leeway for risk-
taking. Nevertheless, even among them, there was a palpable shift from private to
federal insurance, a shift that was required by legislatures in some states. See Michael
Quint, Move to U.S. Insurance Is Seen at Credit Unions, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at D4
(stating that approximately 500 credit unions were expected to move from private to
federal insurance by September of 1991).
169 Accordingly, even when the government undertakes the task of insuring
possibly correlated risks, it also has incentive to control or limit its exposure to
catastrophic losses. For example, legislation was recently introduced in Congress to
reform the national flood insurance program. See Gregory Spears, Flood-Insurance
Plan Worries Coastal Owners, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 2, 1991, at A2. "[T]here is a
potential for immense losses as natural forces such as wind and water move barrier
islands. Insuring homes built on shifting sands is like issuing life insurance policies
to 80-year-olds .... " Id. (paraphrasing a national flood insurance official). The
proposed legislation would forbid certain potentially risky construction and pressure
some insured homeowners to move. See id.
Unfortunately, the federal government failed to minimize its losses in deposit
insurance. See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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Deposit insurance inherently creates incentives for S&L
executives to take excessive risks, whether the insurance is provided
by federal deposit insurers or by private D&O insurers covering
liability suits following insolvency. When a person acquires insur-
ance of any type, she will have less of an incentive to prevent a
covered loss by taking extra care, spending more on loss avoidance,
or avoiding activities or situations in which the loss may materialize.
The incentive for risky behavior created by insurance is commonly
referred to as the moral hazard phenomenon.17 In the case of
deposit insurance, this phenomenon manifests itself on two levels.
First, without insurance, a customer will be motivated to deposit her
money in a strong bank or S&L-one that carefully manages its
investment portfolio and diversifies its investment risks. According-
ly, such a depositor will theoretically be induced to learn more
about the management practices of the institutions vying to open an
account for her. Deposit insurance eliminates this incentive.
17 1
The security of her deposits assured regardless of the decisions of
an institution's executives, a customer will not choose a bank or
S&L based on its investment track record. Second, the moral
hazard phenomenon is more acutely present because deposit
insurance acts as third-party insurance for S&L executives against
the claims of depositors. "[D]eposit insurance is rather unique in
that the parties whose risk-taking needs to be curtailed (owners and
managers of depository institutions) differ from those that are
insured (depositors)."17 2 These executives are therefore inclined
170 See supra note 134; Priest, supra note 129, at 1547. One can distinguish
between ex ante and ex post moral hazard. The former is "the reduction in
precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of
insurance." Id. The latter is the "increase in claims against the insurance policy
beyond the services the claimant would purchase if not insured." Id.
171 See GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR RESTRUCTURING AMERICA'S
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REPORT OF A TASK FORCE 2-3 (1989) (arguing that because
insured depositors look to the insuring agency for protection rather than to the
depository institution, weakly capitalized institutions taking large risks can bid for
insured deposits on near equal footing with strongly capitalized institutions taking
smaller risks); R. DAN BRUMBAUGH,JR., THRIFrs UNDER SIEGE: RESTORING ORDER TO
AMERICAN BANKING 35, 57 n.5 (1988); ROGER C. KORMENDI ET AL., CRISIS RESOLU-
TION IN THE THRIFT INDUSTRY: A MID-AMERICA INSTITUTE REPORT 13-15 (1989);
James R. Barth et al., Moral Hazard and the Thrift Crisis: An Empirical Analysis, 44
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 22,29 (1990). The argument made by some commentators
is that even if only a few depositors (or deposits) are uninsured, they may exert
enough pressure on S&L management that overly risky investments will be avoided.
See Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 1193-99.
172 BARTH ET AL., supra note 150, at 1.
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to invest the deposits in potentially very profitable, but very risky,
ventures. This is particularly true when the institution is nearing
insolvency.
17 8
To correct for the moral hazard problem, an insurer could
impose certain restrictions on S&Ls and their D&Os. 174 Private
and federal insurers would have very different ways of enforcing
these requirements, however. A private insurer can do no more
than threaten to cancel or deny coverage if the executives of a
particular S&L take undue investment risks. But upon cancellation
(or the threat thereof), the true insureds, the depositors, will still be
exposed to the risk of deposit loss; heavy withdrawals followed by
runs will ensue.1 75 In contrast, a federal agency can be given the
rulemaking and sanction powers necessary to deter excessive risk-
taking on the part of the D&Os without depriving the depositors of
deposit protection.
The powers of federal regulators and insurers exceed those of
private insurers in certain important respects. Federal regulators
possess the power of early closure, the authority to close a weak
S&L even before it is totally insolvent in order to prevent a major
loss. 176 The regulators' capital requirements can serve to compel
175 See BENSTON ET AL., supra note 171, at 3; KORMENDI ET AL., supra note 171, at
13-15. When facing impending insolvency, executives attempt to recover what was
lost, and to do so quickly. This tendency has been empirically demonstrated in a
recent study. See Barth et al., supra note 171, at 29-34.
174 For example, the insurer could mandate investment restrictions that require
the avoidance of specify risky investments, or net worth restrictions that require the
maintenance of a minimum net worth.
175 See supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text for descriptions of recent
examples of how depositors may react to doubtful (not even the absence of) deposit
insurance.
Some have argued that the threat of cancellation of coverage or increases in
premiums may induce the depositors to monitor the bank or S&L's management and
provide "market discipline." See Macey & Miller, supra note 14, at 1193-1202
(discussing the theoretical underpinnings of and empirical evidence for market
discipline);Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:
A Summarj of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 216
(1988) (same). There is no consensus on this point by any means and the debate,
both on theoretical and empirical grounds, has been strong and continues to rage on.
For critiques of the market discipline theory see Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank
Failure?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1162 (1989); Helen A. Garten, Still Banking on the
Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 241, 242-43
(1988).
17 6 See BARTH ET AL., supra note 150, at 29; George G. Kaufman, Framework for the
Future: Resurrecting and Legitimizing the Thrift Industry, in THE FUTURE OF THE THRITT
INDUSTRY 191, 198-205 (1989) (Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Conference of
the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, Dec. 8-9, 1988). It is argued that the
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S&L directors and officers to maintain liquid a specific amount of
money in reserve to refund depositors should the S&L suffer major
losses. 177 In addition, federal regulators have the power to bar a
negligent D&O from serving in any federally insured institution, a
power unavailable to private insurers.178 Enforcing these and
other requirements demands continual monitoring and record
examination. Thus, even if a private company was in principle
willing to insure deposits, it would not do so because it would not
have the means available to a governmental agency to force the kind
of disclosure the above-described measures require.
E. Regulatory Failure and the Search for a Deep Pocket
In analyzing the litigation between the FDIC and the D&O
insurers, a general fairness argument that the federal government
not be allowed to shift the S&L industry's losses to private insurance
companies is attractive. 179 Many commentators have argued that
S&L deregulation in the early 1980s was ill-advised in that it
increased the incentives of S&L directors and officers to take
excessive risks.180 Even if deregulation were, on the whole,
desirable, the federal government still did not install the strict
monitoring and examination apparatus necessary to insure regulato-
ry intervention before catastrophe struck the newly unencumbered
industry.
The combined deregulatory legislation of 1980181 and
1982182 ended a half century of strict governmental control of
costs to the federal government of the S&L crisis have increased because S&Ls tend
to be insolvent for a long period of time before closure, see supra note 16, during
which the S&Ls sink deeper and deeper into debt. See Barth et al., supra 171, at 30.
177 See BENSTON ET AL, supra note 171, at 9-19; Barth et al., supra note 171, at 30.
178 See e.g., Executive Barred from Banking After Failed Attempt to Acquire Illinois
Bank, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 596, 596 (Mar. 6, 1989) (reporting the
removal of a person from the banking business because of his "'demonstrated
dishonesty and disregard for bank safety'") (quoting the FDIC).
179 See FDIC REPORT, supra note 14, app. A at 11 (quoting a comment by CNA
Insurance Companies submitted to the FDIC, stating that "regulators... sought to
reimburse themselves as insurers for losses resulting in some measurable part from
faulty or inadequate regulation. In our view, the government should not look to
private industry to make it whole from the sins of its own excesses."); Lavet, supra
note 28, at 211.
180 See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
181 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA), Pub. L. No. 96-221,94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
182 See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
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S&L actions by abolishing the limits on interest rates that S&Ls
could provide depositors, and expanding both the types of loans
they could offer and the types of assets in which they could invest.
These laws were passed to increase the S&L industry's ability to
remain competitive with commercial banks and money market
funds.1 83 Unfortunately, deregulation also created a considerable
moral hazard for D&Os that needed to be offset by vigilant federal
supervision.184  This did not occur, however. In fact, the funds
available for federal bank examinations declined.18 5  The S&L
industry vigorously lobbied Congress to delay recapitalization of the
federal deposit insurance fund (thereby delaying further closures of
marginal S&Ls) and to keep regulators and examiners at bay.
1 86
96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a
summary of both DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain see BARTH & BRADLEY, supra note
118, at 5-6. For a summary of concurrent regulatory developments, see id. at 9-12.
183 See Azar, supra note 1, at 152-53.
184 See Barth et al., supra note 171, at 29; EdwinJ. Gray, The Role of Regulation in
the Thrift Industry, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 235, 241-45 (1987); Robert V. Shumway,
The Compatibility of Deregulation and Increased Supervision, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 247
passim (1987); William Taylor, Deregulation and Prudent Supervision, 6 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 253,255 (1987). Mr. Gray was then FHLBB Chairman; Mr. Shumway was
then Director of the Division of Bank Supervision at the FDIC; the late Mr. Taylor
was then Director of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the
Federal Reserve (and, most recently, FDIC Chairman).
185 As three former economists for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board asserted:
While the need for examination and supervision is increased in an
increasingly competitive and deregulated environment, [the data] show that
the examination staff and budget failed to keep pace with the growth in
total industry assets and the entry of thrifts into new activities. Highly
trained and well-paid examiners are not made obsolete by deregulation, but
rather become indispensable as competition heats up and capital is eroded
away .... In sum, without adequate safeguards, federal and state deregula-
tion is a cause of the current thrift crisis.
Barth et al., supra note 171, at 28-29.
Similarly, then-FHLBB Chairman Gray bitterly complained in a 1986 speech:
In [1984], [the Office of Management and Budget] simply refused our
pleas for more examiners .... It was difficult, if not impossible, for the
Bank Board to examine and supervise a fast growing industry with many
institutions knee-deep in problems and others on the verge of failure.
* .. [W]e had 750 field examiners nationwide, whose average yearly
salary was 25 thousand dollars. The examiner turnover rate was as high as
28 percent per annum. Entry level salaries were limited to 14 thousand
dollars a year. Yet this field force was called upon to examine an industry
whose assets exceeded one trillion dollars.
Gray, supra note 184, at 243.
186 As one commentator remarked: "First, the industry supported regulatory
accounting standards that masked its serious capital problems during the most critical
phase of the industry's demise. Second, the lobbying campaign led to a dramatic
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Indeed, several members of Congress may have acted improperly in
yielding to lobbyists' pressure.1 87 In the wake of the crisis, com-
mentators have placed responsibility for the industry's failure largely
on the catastrophic mixture of federal deregulation and lax
regulatory supervision.
188
underfunding of the federal government's initial effort to address the S&L crisis."
Grundfest, supra note 20, at 29; see also ADAMS, supra note 20 passim (recounting
example after example of questionable S&L industry influence on Congress); MAYER,
supra note 20 passim (same); EdwinJ. Gray, Warnings Ignored: The Politics of the Crisis,
2 STAN. L & POL. REv. 138, 138-39, 142-44 (1990) (describing congressional delay of
the S&L rescue and intervention in the regulatory process); Thomas Romer & Barry
R. Weingast, Congress: The Genesis of the Thrift Crisis, 2 STAN. L & POL. REv. 37,39-44
(1990) (same); Michael Waldman, The S&9L Collapse: The Cost of a Congres for Sale, 2
STAN. L & POL. REV. 47 passim (1990) (same).
187 Five senators allegedly received improper campaign contributions from Charles
H. Keating,Jr., head of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, a large California S&L.
See David E. Rosenbaum, A Financial Disaster With Many Culprits, N.Y. TIMES,June 6,
1990, at Al, D4. The Senate Ethics Committee "'strongly and severely' reprimanded
[one of them] for acts it called 'improper and repugnant,'" and "admonished" the
others "for giving the appearance of impropriety." An Apology, of Sorts, from a Senator,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, § 4, at 7. "Representatives Jim Wright of Texas, the
Speaker of the House, and Tony Coclho of California, the majoritywhip, were forced
from office ... in part because of questionable dealings with savings officials."
Rosenbaum, supra, at D4. Former House Banking Committee Chairman Fernand St.
Germain "lost his seat in 1988 largely because of gifts from [banking] industry
lobbyists." Id.
Congress did not have a monopoly on this kind of conduct. M. Danny Wall,
Chairman of the FHLBB between 1987 and 1989 (and briefly of the new OTS),
resigned under a cloud. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Top Savings Regulator Resigns and
Strikes Back at His Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1989, at Al. Questions were raised
about Mr. Wall's involvement with Lincoln Savings and Loan, whose resolution is the
costliest ever. See id. "To this day, few people say they understand why Mr. Wall
repeatedly came out with the low estimate. Mr. Wall has repeatedly denied an
assertion by some critics that in a Presidential election year he felt it was his
responsibility to keep the savings crisis quiet." Id. at B19. Even the president's son,
Neil Bush, was found to have violated conflict-of-interest regulations as director of a
Denver S&L, whose failure will cost the federal government more than $1 billion. See
Douglas Frantz, Neil Bush Broke Conflict Rules, Official Decides, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1990, at Dl.
1' See supra notes 184-86. One aspect of this laxity is special accounting rules.
In United States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 111 S. Ct. 1512 (1991), and Cottage
Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991), both tax cases, the Supreme
Court held that the regulatory accounting rules adopted in the early 1980s to hide
S&L losses were immaterial as to questions of tax liability or credit.
It should be noted that as a matter of law the federal government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for any regulatory laxity, due to its discretionary
function exception. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988); see also
United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267,1275 (1991) (holding that the Federal Tort
Claims Act's discretionary function exception reached decisions made by federal
regulators' supervision of S&Ls day-to-day operations).
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Thus, excluding regulatory suits is not only justified as a matter
of basic insurance economics, but also as a matter of fairness.
Private insurers prudently attempted to avoid exposure to failure-
related risks for all the reasons explained earlier in this Part. They
should not be required now to pay for the losses. 18 9 The federal
government undertook to insure these losses; despite the political
costs, it should honor its obligations.
CONCLUSION
When Congress deregulated the S&Ls in the early 1980s, D&Os
of S&Ls were given significant discretion in making investment
decisions. Prior to deregulation, the risk of government lawsuits
against D&Os following an S&L's failure was minimal. Deregulation
enlarged this risk dramatically. D&O insurers responded to this
increased liability by attempting to enforce existing, or create new,
policy clauses that excluded suits brought by federal regulators
incident to institutions' insolvency. In the resulting litigation
between insurers and federal regulators, the FDIC has managed to
win most of the cases dealing with the insured v. insured clause, but
not those dealing with the regulatory exclusion.
This Comment has argued that the insurers' desire to avoid
insuring D&Os of insolvent S&Ls is well-founded in basic insurance
principles. Privately insuring such risks is nearly impossible as the
risks are neither reasonably uniform nor sufficiently independent.
Furthermore, viable D&O insurance in the S&L context requires
monitoring and control of industry activity, a requirement that is
considerably easier for governmental regulators to accomplish than
189 One must sometimes make an affirmative effort to resist the impulsive
penalizing of deep pocket entities simply because they are such. Consider the
following from The Oxford Book of Legal Anecdotes:
We have ajudge in Boston who is indeed brilliant, but a character. A
jury case was being tried before him, a personal injury case, and the jury
sent a note to him with a question asking if, even if there was not any
liability, they could still give the plaintiff some money.
[The judge] sent for the jury. He said to them, "I have your written
question, and I assume from the question that you have found there is no
liability."
The foreman said, "That is so, Your Honour." He said, "All right, sign
this slip then."
After they had signed the slip, which directed a verdict for the
defendant, he said, "I will now answer your question. You may retire to the
jury room and pass round the hat."
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for a private insurer. Private insurers did not willingly insure S&L
executives in an era of deregulation, and they should not now be
found to have done so. Excluding insolvency-related claims from
coverage is not only supported by principles of insurance econom-
ics, but is also desirable. The regulatory exclusion enhances the
availability of insurance for insurable risks by clearly segregating
them from uninsurable ones. Without an enforceable regulatory
exclusion, insurers would not be willing to insure any S&L directors
and officers. Neither Congress nor the courts should now accept
the FDIC's invitation to forge an opposite course. iO
190 Freeing private insurers of this liability does not completely end the inquiry.
If the federal government cannot turn to private insurance to guard against the loss
of deposits upon S&L failure, it faces a choice. One option is for the government to
exit the deposit insurance business altogether. See England, supra note 7, at 254-55.
The alternative is for the government to continue to insure deposits as it has done
in the past. Not only is the latter alternative the more likely course politically, but
federal deposit insurance can be seen as a public good in that it protects the small
depositor and maintains public confidence in the financial system as a whole. Indeed,
the state and federal governments frequently function as insurers. See generally
WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE §§ 14:1-14:20 (6th ed.
1990 & Supp. 1991) (providing multiple examples of the government as insurer).
Unlike private insurer reserves, the government can provide an unconditional,
limitless guarantee. If depositors realized that their money is absolutely safe, federal
funds would rarely be needed because there would be no panic or massive withdrawal
of deposits. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91J. POL. ECON. 401, 413-16 (1983) (employing a theoretical
analysis to demonstrate that bank runs will not occur with government deposit
insurance); William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial
Services Industhy, 1 YALEJ. ON REG. 195,201 (1984) (then-FDIC Chairman arguing that
public confidence in the banking system is a major goal of governmental deposit
insurance). Offering a deposit guarantee, however, imposes on the government a
corresponding duty. If the government wishes to insure S&L deposits unconditional-
ly, it is obligated to regulate and monitor the S&Ls' D&Os' actions closely, as it has
done since the passage of FIRREA. Governmental regulations and guidelines, as well
as supervision and monitoring, should function as safe harbors to complying D&Os,
offering protection from liability incident to insolvency. Accordingly, a division of
labor materializes. Private insurers continue to cover insurable D&O risks, while the
government covers the insolvency risk and enforces appropriate regulations.
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